Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1985

Ernest Albin Bartell v. Lola Bartell : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
C. Gerald Parker; Parker, Thornley and Critchlow; Attorney for Respondent.
George K. Fadel;Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Ernest Albin Bartell v. Lola Bartell, No. 198520795.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/607

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

OFCT
Ui
45..

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

m>

STATE OF UTAH

DOCKi

In the Matter of the Estate
of
ERNEST ALBIN BARTELL, a/k/a
ERNEST A. BARTELL, a/k/a
EARNEST A. BARTELL,
Deceased.

Case No. 20795

LOLA BARTELL,
Appellant,
ALMA ALKEMA, Personal
Representative,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the Order of the
Second Judicial District Court of
Weber County, State of Utah
THE HONORABLE DAVID E. ROTH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

C. GERALD PARKER
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
2610 Washington Boulevard
P. 0. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: (801) 399-3303
Attorney for Respondent
GEORGE K. FADEL
170 West Fourth South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 295-2421
Attorney for Appellant

FILED
N0V2 01985

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.
2.
3.
4.

.1

Nature of the Case
Course of the Proceedings
Disposition in the District Court
Statement of Material Facts

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

.7

ARGUMENT
POINT I

1
1
2
2

9
DECEDENT MADE NO PRECISE STATEMENT THAT
HE INTENDED THE TRANSFERS OUTSIDE THE
WILL TO BE IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY
PROVISION, BUT WHEN THE TESTIMONY OF
RESPONDENT'S WITNESSES IS COMPARED TO
THAT OF APPELLANT'S WITNESSES, IT IS
EVIDENT THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF
DECEDENT'S STATEMENTS ESTABLISH HIS
INTENT THAT THE LIFETIME TRANSFERS TO
HIS SECOND WIFE WERE TO BE IN LIEU OF
A TESTAMENTARY PROVISION
..

11

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
DECEDENT PROVIDED FOR HIS SECOND WIFE
BY TRANSFERS OUTSIDE THE WILL AND HIS
INTENT TO DO SO IS EVIDENCED BY THE
AMOUNT OF THE TRANSFERS

15

POINT III "OTHER EVIDENCE" WAS CORRECTLY
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT TO ESTABLISH
DECEDENT'S INTENT THAT THE TRANSFERS
HE MADE OUTSIDE THE WILL WERE TO BE
IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY PROVISION .

20

CONCLUSION

23

ADDENDUM

25

POINT II

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited
Page
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc
Utah, 657 P2d 743 (1982)

9

Matter of Estate of Christensen v. Christensen . . . . 10
Utah, 655 P2d 646 (1982)
Matter of Estate of Frandson v. Frandson
North Dakota, 356 N.W.2d 125 (1955)

19

Matter of Estate of Knudsen v. Knudsen
North Dakota, 342 N.W.Zd 387 (1984)

18

Matter of Estate of Taggart v. Taggart
New Mexico, 619 P2d 562, U ALR 4th 1201 (1980)

16

Utah Uniform Probate Code, Title 75-2-301
11 ALR 4th 1213

7
10

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1,

Is Lola Bartell an "omitted spouse11 under the

provisions of Title 75-2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code
and thereby entitled to set aside the will of her deceased
husband, Ernest Albin Bartell, and receive her intestate
share of his estate as his surviving widow?
In answering this question, there is an even more
basic issue which must be considered, to-wit:
2.

Did Ernest Albin Bartell provide for his second

spouse, Lola Bartell, by transfers outside of his will, and
if so, did he intend that such transfers be in lieu of a
testamentary provision for her?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal by Lola Bartell from an order of
the District Court denying her petition wherein she is seeking
to be declared an "omitted spouse" under the provisions of
Title 75-2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
2.

Course of the Proceedings.

The will of Ernest Albin Bartell, deceased, was
filed for probate in the District Court of Weber County, Utah
and on February 15, 1985, Alma Alkema was appointed as the
Personal Representative of the estate of said decedent. Lola
Bartell, widow of said decedent, thereafter filed her petition
seeking to be declared an omitted spouse, pursuant to Title 75-
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2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
3.

Disposition in the District Court,

The Honorable David E. Roth denied the said petition,
finding that Lola Bartell was not an "omitted spouse?f under
the Utah statute and ordering that all of said decedent's
property which was not placed in the name of petitioner by
decedent during his lifetime, or which he did not place in
joint tenancy with her, is to be probated under decedent's
will, dated January 11, 1963.
4.

Statement of Material Facts.

Following an illness of several weeks, decedent
Ernest Albin Bartell, died testate on April 28, 1984 at the
age of 72 years, and at the time of his death he was a
resident of Weber County, Utah (R. 1). On February 15, 1985,
Alma Alkema was appointed as the personal representative of
the estate of said decedent, and decedent's will, dated
January 11, 1963, was informally probated (R. 15).
Decedent married his first wife, Cindy, on
December 2, 1940 and they were married to each other until
her death of cancer 40 years later on January 17, 1981 (T. 74).
There were no children born of this marriage (T. 75) and
each of the parties was employed for at least 30 years of
the marriage, she as a secretary with the government, and
he at Utah Power & Light (T. 76 & 77).
At the time of their marriage, Cindy owned an
unencumbered home at 2163 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah (T. 75)
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and this home was placed by her in joint tenancy with
decedent approximately one year after their marriage (T. 186).
Later in their marriage, decedent and his first wife,
Cindy, built a home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South Ogden, Utah
(T. 101). Decedent was his own contractor and did much of
the work on the home himself, as did his wife, Cindy, who did
painting, shingling, and "everything she could do physically11
(T. 38 & 102).

Decedent!s brother, Art, spent what was des-

cribed as thousands of hours working on the home and his
brother-in-law, Ferris Kennedy, spent hundreds of hours working there (T. 101 & 102).

Decedentfs brothers-in-law, Richard

and Alma Alkema, also worked on the home (T. 102) which was
described as a "family project" (T. 39). Appellant's Statement of Facts that the only persons who helped to build the
house were Ferris Kennedy, decedent's brother, Art, and
Cindy, is not correct.
The South Ogden home was placed in joint tenancy
by decedent and his first wife, Cindy, and within six
months after Cindy's death, decedent effected a severance of
that joint tenancy, and he was the sole owner of said home
at the time of his death (T. 87).
Decedent and his first wife had a strong and stable
marriage relationship and got along very well together.

Their

relationship was described as being close and loving, and they
were affectionate and devoted marriage partners (T. 63, 70, 78,
& 112).

During their marriage, they acquired together by their
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joint efforts substantially all of the assets which were owned
by decedent at the time of his marriage to his second wife,
Lola (T. 36). They were both very frugal, and Cindy even
purchased many of her clothes second hand at Deseret Industries
and then remodeled them herself (T. 77).
Although decedent and his first wife had no children
of their own, they had an extremely close relationship with
decedent's niece, Brenda, whom they treated very much as if
she were their own daughter (T. 39). BrendaTs mother had died
when she was five years of age and her father, decedentfs
brother, Art, was not able to care for her, partially because of
an alcohol problem (T. 108). Brenda lived with decedent and
Cindy while she was a student and they were the first parents
she ever had (T. 110) and were described as "kind of surrogate
parents" (T. 40). Even after Cindy's death and decedent's
later marriage to Lola, he continued to treat Brenda like his
daughter (T. 40), and he treated her children as his own
grandchildren (T. 40).
Decedent and his first wife had a close and loving
relationship with their brothers and sisters (T. 39) and
he continued to maintain such a relationship with his first
wife's family after his marriage to Lola (T. 39).
Decedent married his second wife, Lola, on February 27,
1982, and was married to her until the time of his death
on April 28, 1984, a period of two years and two months (T. 9
& R. 1). At the time of her marriage to decedent, Lola owned
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an unencumbered home in Bountiful worth $50,000; household
furniture and furnishings worth approximately $5,000; a
1975 Mercury automobile worth approximately $1,500; and
bank accounts worth about $5,000 (T. 23). These assets
had been accumulated during her 31-year marriage to her
first husband (T. 23). Lola was employed at the South Davis
Medical Center earning approximately $1,300 per month at
the time of her marriage to decedent and had worked for
approximately 24 years prior thereto (T. 23). After her
marriage to decedent, she moved into his home in South Ogden
and rented her Bountiful home which she still owns and from
which she now receives approximately $450 per month rental
(T. 24). She has not been employed since this marriage (T. 25).
Decedent was described by just about everybody as
an intelligent, alert, and meticulous man who knew what he
was doing (R. 83, T. 70 & 78).

He was a good manager and was

astute in business matters (T. 37 & 38).

During his marriage

to Lola, he made 11 different transfers to her directly or as
a joint owner with him of bank accounts totaling $181,597.16
(R. 53 & 78 & T. 25). On May 18, 1982, he transferred to
her stock in Utah Power & Light Company having a value on
that date of $23,658.25 (R. 54, T. 26 & 78).

She has

also received $24,905 as the beneficiary of six life
insurance policies (R. 45, T. 26 & 78).

This amounts to a

total of $230,160.41 of assets transferred by decedent to
his second wife during their two-year marriage (T. 27 & 78).
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When this is added to the value of the assets which Lola
brought into this marriage, she now has total assets in
excess of $290,000.
The assets which were owned by decedent in his own
name at the time of his death, and which the trial court
ruled are subject to the terms of his will, consist of the
home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South Ogden, Utah, worth about
$100,000, a Utah Power & Light Credit Union Account of
approximately $12,000, a 1976 Buick automobile, a 1970
International Travelall, a 1964 Airflow house trailer, and
household furniture and furnishings (T. 34-36).
The home which decedent's first wife owned prior
to their marriage was sold by decedent during his marriage
to his second wife and she received the sales proceeds of
$15,000 which are now part of the bank accounts she
received totaling $181,597.16 (T. 36 & 37).
The devisees and legatees under decedentfs will
consist of Jay Wendell Swain, decedent's foster brother,
and Juanita Eddy Taggart, Cindy's cousin, each of whom were
given specific bequests of $2,000 and the remainder of
the estate is to be divided equally between decedent's
sister, Sylvia Bartell Child, his niece, Brenda Josephine
Bartell Heslop, his first wife's sister, Florence Marguarite
Alkema Kennedy, and his first wife's three brothers, Carl
Henry Alkema, Alma Alkema, and Richard Myron Alkema (R. 6-8).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The applicable statute in this case is Title 75-2-301
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code which reads as follows:
n

Omitted spouse.--(1) If a testator fails
to provide by will for his surviving spouse
who married the testator after the execution
of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive
the same share of the estate he would have
received if the decedent left no will unless
it appears from the will that the omission
was intentional or the testator provided for
the spouse by transfer outside the will and "
the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a
testamentary provision is shown by statement's
of the testator or from the amount of the
transfer or otKer evidence, (emphasis added)
(2) In satisfying a share provided by
this section, the devises made by the will
abate as provided in section 75-3-902."
It is evident that Lola meets part of the requirements
necessary to be declared an "omitted spouse".

The will

executed by decedent in 1963 did not provide for Lola, who
married decedent many years after the execution of the will
and, of course, it does not appear from the will that the
omission was intentional.

She fails, however, to qualify as

an omitted spouse because the decedent provided for her
outside the will, as evidenced by his having transferred to
her during their two-year marriage assets consisting of bank
accounts, corporate stock, and life insurance, having a
total value of $230,160.41.

The statute requires that the

intent that the transfers outside the will be in lieu of a
testamentary provision must be shown (1) by statements of
the testator, or (2) from the amount of the transfer, or (3)
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from other evidence.
(1)

Decedent made no precise statement that he

intended the transfers outside the will to be in lieu of a
testamentary provision, but when the testimony of respondent's
witnesses is compared to that of appellant's witnesses, it is
evident that the implications of decedent's statements establish his intent that the lifetime transfers to his second
wife were to be in lieu of a testamentary provision.
(2)

The amount of the transfers made by decedent

to his second wife outside the will ($230,160.41) in and of
itself show his intent that said transfers were in lieu of a
testamentary provision.
(3)

"Other evidence11 reinforces the conclusion

that decedent intended that the lifetime transfers to his
second wife were in lieu of a testamentary provision.

This

includes the following:
(a)

The transfer of 11 different bank

accounts from decedent to his second wife
totaling $181,597.16, together with the transfer of Utah Power & Light Company stock in
the sum of $23,658, and her being designated
as the beneficiary of some six life insurance
policies totaling $24,905 shows a pattern of
giving which decedent would no doubt have continued to follow with respect to his remaining
assets had he intended his second wife to re-
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ceive them.
(b)

Being the meticulous and astute busi-

ness person that he was, and being familiar with
real estate and joint tenancy concepts as he was,
it would be expected that he would either transfer
his remaining property to his second wife or change
his will had he intended her to receive it.
(c)

Decedent no doubt considered what the

desires of his first wife would have been regarding the disposition of property she owned prior
to their marriage and that which she worked
throughout their marriage to assist in acquiring
as it relates to whether such property should
go to dececent's second wife of two years, or
her own close family members.
ARGUMENT
In the case of Hal Taylor Associates v.
Unionamerica, Inc., Utah, 657 P2d 743 (1982), this Court, in
referring to the decision of the trial court, stated:
M

It is well established that this Court
will presume findings of fact to be correct
and will not overturn them so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
.... The Court must view the evidence and
all inferences that might reasonably be made
from the evidence in a light most favorable to
the judgment entered. .... Where the evidence
is in conflict, we defer to the trial court's
first-hand assessment of the witnesses' credibility &nd assume that the trial court
believed those aspects of the evidence which
support its findings."
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The findings of the trial court are supported in this
case by substantial evidence and where there is conflicting
evidence, the trial court no doubt believed those aspects of
the evidence which support its findings.
The applicable statute in this case is Title 75-2-301
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, quoted Supra. As pointed out
in the case of Estate of Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 655
P2d 646 (1982) , this statute Mhas never been construed by this
Court, and has rarely been construed in other jurisdictions'1.
Although the Christensen case cites the statute, its facts
are not applicable to this case and no other Utah cases have
been found construing the statute.
The referenced Utah statute is the same as the
Uniform Probate Code §2-301 and 11 ALR 4th 1213 deals with
this section.

After pointing out that an omitted spouse may

elect to take against the will, it is stated:
"However, the drafters of the Code also
recognized that a spouse may provide for
his spouse's future financial security by
making various pre-death transfers of his
real and personal property to his spouse
and that such transfers might be intended
to be in lieu of any possible testamentary
provisions that spouse might make. For
that reason, the drafters of the Code
provided in §2-301 that if such a transfer was made by a spouse prior to death
with the intention to provide for his
survivor .... the surviving spouse would
be forbidden to take a statutory share.!!
The trial court correctly concluded that in the
present case the basic question is whether decedent intended
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to provide for his second wife by transfers outside the wi
and that such intent may be shown in one of three ways:
(1) By statements of the testator.
(2) From the amount of the transfers.
(3) From other evidence.
POINT I
DECEDENT MADE NO PRECISE STATEMENT THAT HE
INTENDED THE TRANSFERS OUTSIDE THE WILL TO
BE IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY PROVISION, BUT
WHEN THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S WITNESSES
IS COMPARED TO THAT OF APPELLANT'S WITNESSES,
IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF
DECEDENT'S STATEMENTS ESTABLISH HIS INTENT
THAT THE LIFETIME TRANSFERS TO HIS SECOND
WIFE WERE TO BE IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY
PROVISION
The trial court stated, in paragraph 15 of its
findings of fa,ct, as follows:
"15. Decedent did not make any specific
definite statement to any person as to what his
intention was. Statements testified to by
either side pretty much tend to wash each other
out." (R. 85)
Appellant's allegations that there was testimony
from three disinterested persons (Richard Heaton, Doris
Ashby, and Eldon Ellis) that decedent intended for Lola to
inherit his house and furniture, is just not true. The
testimony of Richard Heaton was that when he learned that
decedent was going to be married, he inquired of him as to
whether he was going to live in Bountiful or whether they
would live in Ogden.

The response was:
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M

And the statement was made by Ernie that
she had a home in Bountiful, and that they
would--that he was encouraging her to
either rent or sell the home, and that she
was going to come and live with him in
Ogden in the home there." (T. 54)
The fact that the parties were going to live in his
home in Ogden certainly is not an indication that he intended
to leave the home to her on his death.

The conversation took

place shortly prior to his marriage and had nothing to do with
contemplation of death.
When Mr. Heaton was asked on cross-examination if
decedent ever said that he was going to give his house to her
for her to own outright, his response was, lfHe never made
that statement to me11 (T. 57).
The testimony of Doris Ashby was equally as indefinite
on this subject.

She testified that in a conversation with

decedent shortly before his marriage to Lola, she asked, referring to Lola,

nr

Whatfs she going to do with her house?' And

he says, TWell, I told her she could either rent it or sell
it, she wouldn't need it, she would have mine. ,ff
Again, this discussion took place prior to the
marriage and in no way was in anticipation of decedent's death.
It was obvious that he intended she would have the use of his
home and that they would be living there together.

He prob-

ably anticipated at the time of the conversation that he
would later transfer substantial assets to her, which he did
to the extent of over $230,000. When asked specifically on
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cross-examination whether decedent ever told Mrs. Ashby that
"on his death he was going to give her his house" she responded, n No, the subject never came up anymore.M

(T. 65)

The testimony of Eldon Ellis of a conversation he
claims to have had with decedent on March 16, 1982 , wherein
decedent stated, "'No,1 he says, 'if anything happens to me,
Lola gets the house. And she won't have to worry about
money.IM is not persuasive.

That conversation took place

seventeen days after decedent's remarriage.

As Mr. Ellis

indicated, decedent was Mjust almost honeymooning stillM
and was not talking about death or any anticipation of his
dying (T. 72). Should it be determined that he at that time
intended that Lola would have the house upon his death, he
obviously changed his mind later on when he made the 11
transfers of bank accounts to her, together with the transfers of the stock and life insurance.

The critical consider-

ation is not what decedent's intent was prior to, or early
in his second marriage when these conversations were had, but
rather at the time he later made the transfers outside the
will.
Ferris Kennedy testified of a conversation he had
some six or eight months after the parties were married. At
that time, decedent had become "a little peeved" at the
amount of time that Lola was spending away from home in
Bountiful, and in response to a question by Mr. Kennedy as
to whether the parties were going to continue to live in the
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house in Ogden or were going to move to Bountiful to be
closer to Lola's family and her exercise class, decedent
"'Oh,' he says, !thatfs her home and I have my

responded:

home'." (T. 104)
Decedent's further intention that Lola not have his
home is evidenced by a conversation which decedent had with
Ferris Kennedy approximately a year after the parties were
married and at a time when decedent was apparently not quite
so sure about the stability of his second marriage. Mr.
Kennedy asked the question, "Well, are you still going to
maintain the home in Bountiful as well as the one in Ogden?",
to which decedent replied, "Oh, yeah, just in case this thing
doesn't work out we will both have a place to go."

(T. 105)

These conversations, of course, took place sometime after the
honeymoon was over.
During all of these conversations, it is evident
that decedent was conscious of the fact that he had executed
a will many years earlier providing for his niece, Brenda
and other close relatives.

During a conversation with Brenda

shortly before his marriage in which they were discussing
the problems of second marriages, Brenda said, "'Uncle Ern,
you know, there are many stories that I have heard with
second marriages and financial conditions that unless there
are specific things stated that there can be lots of
problems.'

And I just said, 'You know', I told him about

an example. And he said--he just laughed it off 'don't bring
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that up, I have got the will1.11
It is evident from this conversation that decedent
remembered and relied upon the will he had prepared years
earlier.
It is clear from all of the foregoing testimony,
decedent, by his statements, does not indicate an intention
that his home should be given to Lola upon his death.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DECEDENT
PROVIDED FOR HIS SECOND WIFE BY TRANSFERS
OUTSIDE THE WILL AND HIS INTENT TO DO SO IS
EVIDENCED BY THE AMOUNT OF THE TRANSFERS
The trial court, in paragraph 16 of its findings o
fact, stated:
!f

16. The large amount of assets transferred
by decedent to his second wife suggest there was
an intent for him to provide for her outside of
the will and this is significant.11 (R. 85-86)
Prior to her marriage to decedent, Lola had lived
under rather modest circumstances. After 31 years of marria
she and her first husband had accumulated assets, including
their home, of a value of approximately $60,000, or approximately $2,000 for each of the years they were married to
each other.
During her two-year marriage to decedent, he
transferred assets to her in excess of $230,000, or almost
four times as much as she and her first husband had accumulated in 31 years.

Decedent no doubt recognized that should
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he predecease Lola, she would still have her home in Bountiful
and could put the $230,000 she received from him into an
investment, which at 10 per cent interest would produce in
excess of $1,900 per month income to her, without invading
any of the principal investment.

This is almost one and a

half times as much as the $1,300 per month she was earning
at the time of her marriage to decedent.

Lola testified

that were she living in her Bountiful home, which she still
owns, her living expenses would be about $1,000 a month (T. 33
& 34) and, of course, she would be very comfortable living
merely on the interest from the money received from decedent.
Although there are no Utah cases on this subject,
and few in other jurisdictions, one case that is particularly
significant is Matter of Estate of Taggart, New Mexico, 619
P2d 562, 11 ALR 4th 1201 (1980).

In that case, the testator

executed a will leaving his entire estate to his deceased
wife's mother, and should she predecease the testator the
estate was to be divided between three individuals who were
friends or distant relatives of the deceased.

Subsequent to

the execution of the will, he married Margie who was not
provided for in the previously executed will.

After the

testator's death, Margie claimed she was an omitted spouse
under a New Mexico statute identical to that in Utah. A
jury found that decedent had provided for his second wife by
three transfers outside the will and that by virtue of the
size of the transfers, they were intended to be lieu of
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testamentary provisions for Margie.
consisted of:

The three transfers

(1) designating her as a joint tenant on a

checking account in the sum of $2,889.87; (2) designating
her as a joint tenant on a savings account with a balance of
$15,908.00; and (3) making an election under his retirement plan providing her with benefits amounting to $410.00
per month.

The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the

decision of the jury and noted that three factors were
significant in determining the decedent's intent. These
were (1) the period of time the couple had been married,
(2) the amount transferred to the second wife, and (3) the
portion of the total estate to others.
(1) The New Mexico Court felt it was important that
the parties had been married for less than two years. This is
comparable to the two years two months that the appellant and
decedent were married to each other in the present case.
(2) The amount of the transfers in the New Mexico
case are only a fraction of the transfers of $230,000.00 made
in the present case. Yet, the New Mexico Court felt they were
sufficiently large to constitute evidence of decedent's intent.
(3) The evidence in the New Mexico case was that
the transfers to Margie outside the will represented 20 per
cent of the total estate.

In the present case, the amount

of transfers by decedent to Lola amounted to approximately
two-thirds of the total estate.
Under the circumstances, the decision of the trial
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court in this case is considerably more compelling than that
of the New Mexico case.
Another case of significance is Matter of Estate
of Knudsen, North Dakota, 342 N.W.2d 387 (1984).

In that

case, decedent, in 1962, executed a will leaving his entire
estate to his first wife.

Thirteen years later, he divorced

her and married his second wife, who, of course, was not
named in the will.

Four years later, he died and his second

wife sought to be declared an omitted spouse under a statute
identical to that in Utah.

There was evidence that decedent

transferred assets into joint tenancy with himself and his
second wife, and that he also named her the beneficiary of
several life insurance policies, with the total of the
joint tenancy property and life insurance proceeds being
equivalent to just over one-third of his total estate. His
second wife contended that neither the transfers to the
joint tenancy nor the naming her as beneficiary on his
insurance policies constituted a "transfer" to her. The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court to the effect that these were, in fact, "transfers"
within the meaning of the Uniform Probate Code and held that
a trier of fact may determine from the amount of the transfer alone whether or not the deceased intended that the
transfers to a spouse outside of the will be in lieu of a
testamentary provision.

The Court then ruled that the said

transfers of approximately one-third of the total estate
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were of a sufficient amount to show decedent's intent that
the transfers were in lieu of a testamentary provision.
Another important North Dakota case was decided
shortly thereafter.

In Matter of Estate of Frandson, North

Dakota, 356 N.W.2d 125 (1984), it was determined that a
husband was not an omitted spouse under the North Dakota
statute where his second wife died approximately three years
after their marriage, leaving a will executed three years
prior to their marriage, which obviously did not contain a
provision for the husband.

During their marriage, the second

wife had transferred into joint tenancy with her husband
property worth approximately $81,000. On the date of
her death, the value of her solely owned property was more
than $94,000. The Court considered that the parties
were married for a relatively short period of time and that
the evidence reflected that the decedent during her marriage
consciously retained certain assets in her own name. The
Court then stated, at page 127:
"Louis received from Elsie a substantial
portion of her estate by her placement of
property into joint tenancy. Of the $136,000
value of the property held in joint tenancy,
Elsie contributed $81,000. Elsie's contribution to the joint tenancy property was
almost as much as the amount she retained
for disposition by will. Having carefully
reviewed the record, we cannot say the trial
court's finding that Elsie provided for
Louis by transfers outside the will with
the intent that the transfers be in lieu of
a testamentary provision is clearly erroneous ."
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It should be remembered that in the present case,
Lola contributed nothing whatsoever to the joint tenancy
property and that it all came from the efforts of decedent
and his first wife, Cindy.
If the present case, where the "omitted spouse11
received over $230,000 during a two-year marriage, does not
meet the "amount of the transfers" requirement of the statute,
it is difficult to conceive that any case would ever meet such
requirement.
POINT III
"OTHER EVIDENCE" WAS CORRECTLY FOUND BY THE
TRIAL COURT TO ESTABLISH DECEDENT'S INTENT
THAT THE TRANSFERS HE MADE OUTSIDE THE WILL
WERE TO BE IN LIEU OF A TESTAMENTARY PROVISION
The trial court made the following finding in this
regard:
"17. Decedent is described by just about
everybody as a man who knew what he was doing.
He was intelligent, alert, and meticulous.
Because of this, and because he did evidence
a pattern of giving to his second wife and
transferring properties to her, it is the
impression of the Court that had he wanted to
transfer the house to her, he would have done
it. Had he wanted her to have everything, he
would have changed his Will. He didn't die
a suddent death. He was ill a period of time
and he knew he was ill. At that time, if he
wanted to clear up any affairs that he thought
were loose ends he could have done it and at
that time, if he had intended to transfer the
house, that would have been the time to do it.
This is evidence that he intended the house
to pass by his previous Will,
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18. The Court believes that the house
in South Ogden may have been a sentimental
item to decedent that he thought had
connections with his previous family and he
thought they should dispose of it and dispose
of the proceeds of the sale, because they all
helped build it." (R. 85-86)
In addition to decedent being an intelligent, alert,
and meticulous man who knew the nature and extent of his
property and who was a good manager, he was well acquainted
with the procedure for transferring real estate and the
implications of joint tenancy. He knew that the severance
of joint tenancy in real estate required the filing of an
affidavit and death certificate with the county recorder's
office, as he has previously done this with respect to both
the Grant Avenue and South Ogden properties (T. 86-87).

Had

he intended that Lola should have his South Ogden home, he
surely would have gone through the relatively simple procedure, with which he was acquainted, of having the property
placed in her name, particularly considering his deliberate
actions in making 11 different conveyances of bank accounts
to her*
this.

It is significant, however, that he did not do
He had obviously given consideration to the ownership

of the South Ogden home, however, inasmuch as he severed the
joint tenancy in that property while he was dating Lola. As
previously indicated, about this time, he took consolation
in the fact that he had a will which he discussed with his
niece, Brenda, during the time he was dating Lola. Being
the astute and meticulous person he was, he would surely
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have changed the will had he intended that it no longer be
in effect.
Considering decedent's loving and close relationship
with his first wife, he also no doubt considered what would
be fair and equitable from her standpoint.

He was aware of

the great love and affection she had for her brothers and
sister, which was a relationship he also shared and fostered
even after Cindy's death and his marriage to Lola.

He no

doubt considered how Cindy would have felt about everything
she had worked for 30 years to acquire, including the home
she had owned outright before her marriage to Ernie, going
to Lola after a two-year marriage to Ernie, to the exclusion
of her own family members.
He must also have given thought to his niece,
Brenda, and their almost parent-child relationship.
In anticipating that the home would go under the
provisions of the will, he obviously remembered those who
had helped in the construction of the home, including Cindy,
his brother, Art, and his brothers-in-law, Ferris, Richard,
and Alma.

The trial judge correctly observed that this home,

the construction of which had been a "family project" was
no doubt intentionally left to those family members who were
so closely involved in its construction and to the loved ones
of those now deceased.
Any self-serving testimony given by Lola claiming
that decedent, by implication, intended her to have his
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South Ogden home is clearly rebutted by the actual conduct
of decedent.
The evidence indicates that Lola knew at the time
of decedent's death that it was never intended that she have
the home.

This is evident from the conversation she had with

Brenda Heslop and Florence Kennedy on August 20, 1984 when
she talked about her claim to the home. Florence recalls the
statement of Lola, as follows:
"She said she had everything, and if she
lived longer with Ernie, she would have gotten
the house, too." (T. 89)
Brenda recalls the conversation as:
IT

She said, 'Well, it is just too bad
he didn't live longer because I would have
got the house toof." (T. 121)
CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court denying the petition
of Lola Bartell seeking to be declared an "omitted spouse"
should be affirmed and all of the assets which were owned
by decedent in his own right at the time of his death should
be probated under his will dated January 11, 1963.
Respectfully submitted this
22nd day of November, 1985.
7*7 C. Gerald Barker

C. Gerald Parker
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of November,
1985, I hand delivered 10 copies of the Respondent's brief
to the Utah Supreme Court Clerk and four copies to George K.
Fadel, Attorney for Appellant, at 170 West Fourth South,
Bountiful, Utah 84010.

7$7 C Gerald Earfer

C. Gerald P a r k e r
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C. Gerald Parker
Attorney for Personal Representative
2610 Washington Boulevard
P. 0. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: 399-3303
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
0
K
<

of

5 s
ID 0

00

oh

ERNEST ALBIN BARTELL, a/k/a
ERNEST A. BARTELL, a/k/a
EARNEST A. BARTELL,
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Probate No. 15771

Deceased.
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o
o
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(II

The petition of LOLA BARTELL, pursuant to which she
is seeking to be declared an "omitted spouse" under Title 75-2-301
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, came on regularly for hearing
on the 31st day of May, 1985, before the Honorable David E. Roth,
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting without a
jury.

The petitioner, LOLA BARTELL, appeared in person and was

represented by her counsel, GEORGE K. FADEL.

ALMA ALKEMA, the

Personal Representative of decedent's estate, appeared in person
and was represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker.

The Court

heard evidence introduced on behalf of both the petitioner and
the %a£H Personal Representative, and after being fully advised
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EXHIRIT A
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in the premises, now makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That decedent, ERNEST ALBIN BARTELL, died testate

on April 28, 1934, at the age of 72 years, and at the time of
his death, he was a resident of Weber County, Utah.
2.

That on February 15, 1985", ALMA ALKEMA was appointed

as the Personal Representative of the estate of said decedent,
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and decedent's Will, dated January 11, 1963 was informally
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probated.

h >
K j
o
U 3 ^ *

0 £ *

^5 ffl 0 CD

z

>- x 5
i o m =>
I | d£
r% I

. UJ

r 5 * D
- £ O
^

t

CO

3.

That decedent married his first wife, CINDY, on

December 2, 1940.

They were married to each other until CINDY'S

death of cancer 40 years later on January 17, 1981.

There were

no children born of this marriage and each of the parties was

L

employed during substantially all of the marriage, he at Utah
Power & Light Company and she at Defense Depot Ogden.
4.

That at the time of their marriage, CINDY owned

a home which was paid for at 2163 Grant Avenue, Ogden, Utah.
During the marriage, this home was placed in joint tenancy with
CINDY and the decedent.
5.

During their marriage, decedent and his first wife,

CINDY, built a home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South Ogden, Utah.
Members of decedent's family, including his brother, and members
of CINDY'S family, including her brothers and brothers-in-law,

In4md

<

spent many hours working together with CINDY and decedent in
building said home.
6.

The said South Ogden home was acquired in joint

tenancy by decedent and his first spouse, CINDY, and after CINDY'S
death, decedent effected a severance of that joint tenancy and
at the time of decedent's death, he was the sole owner of said
home.
7.

That during the marriage of decedent and his first
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wife, CINDY, they acquired together substantially all of the
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assets which were owned by decedent at the time of his marriage
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to LOLA BARTELL, on February 27, 1982.
8.

«• ui

< f
5 o

That decedent was married to LOLA BARTELL for two

years and two months, until his death on April 28, 1984. Said

5

decedent did not die a sudden death but was ill for the last
several weeks of his life,
9.

Decedent was an intelligent, alert, and meticulous

man who was described by just about everybody as a man who knew
what he was doing.

He evidenced a pattern of giving to his

second wife, LOLA, and during their marriage, he transferred to
her some 11 bank accounts totaling approximately $181,597.16.
He also transferred to her during their marriage stock in Utah
Power & Light Company in the sum of $23,658.25.

At the time

of his death, he left life insurance proceeds to her in the sum
of $24,905.00.
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All together, he left her a total of $230,160.41.
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10.
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That at the time of her marriage to decedent, LOLA

BARTELL, owned a home at Bountiful, Utah which she states was
worth approximately $50,000.00, furniture, a 1975 Mercury
automobile, and accounts totaling about $5,000.00.

She was, at

that time, employed at the South Davis Medical Center earning
approximately $1,300.00 per month.
11.

During the marriage of decedent and LOLA BARTELL,

they resided in his home in South Ogden and LOLA BARTELL was not
0
Ec
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employed during their marriage.

g
o £*

12.

The assets which were owned by decedent in his
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own name, at the time of his death, and which are subject to the
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terms of his Will, are the home at 4580 Orchard Avenue, South
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Ogden, Utah, a Utah Power & Light Credit Union account of
approximately $12,000.00, a 1976 Buick automobile, a 1970
International Travelall, a 1964 Airflow house trailer, and

L

household furniture and furnishings.
13.

That the devisees and legatees under decedent's

Will consist of JAY WENDELL SWAIN, decedentfs foster brother,
and JUANITA EDDY TAGGART, CINDY'S cousin, each of whom were
given specific bequests of $2,000.00 each, and the remainder
of the estate is to be divided in equal shares between decedentfs
sister, SYLVIA BARTELL CHILD, his niece, BRENDA JOSEPHINE BARTELL
HESLOP, his first wife's sister, FLORENCE MARGUARITE ALKEMA KENNEDY
and^hls first wife's three brothers, CARL HENRY ALKEMA, ALMA ALKEMA

and RICHARD MYRON ALKEMA.
14.

That the applicable statute in this case is

Title 75-2-301 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code which is intended
to protect an overlooked spouse.

The basic question is whether

this spouse (decedent's second wife) was overlooked by her
husband and whether decedent intended that the Will operate to
the extent that it could and whether he intended to provide for
her separately.
0

The statute suggests that the Court look at

three things to determine what decedent's intention was. First,
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any statements that decedent made.

The next is the amount of
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the transfers decedent made to his second wife outside of the
Will, and the third is other evidence.
15.

Decedent did not make any specific definite statement

to any person as to what his intention was.

Statements testified

to by either side pretty much tend to wash each other out.
16.

The large amount of assets transferred by decedent

to his second wife suggest there was an intent for him to provide
for her outside of the Will and this is significant.
17.

Decedent is described by just about everybody as

a men who knew what he was doing.
meticulous.

He was intelligent, alert, and

Because of this, and because he did evidence a pattern

of giving to his second wife and transferring properties to her,
it is the impression of the Court that had he wanted to transfer
the house to her. he would have done it.

-5-

Had he wanted her to

Indtxtd

have everything, he would have changed his Will.
a sudden death.
ill.

He didn't die

He was ill a period of time and he knew he was

At that time, if he wanted to clear up any affairs that he

thought were loose ends he could have done it and at that time,
if he had intended to transfer the house, that would have been
the time to do it.

This is evidence that he intended the house

to pass by his previous Will.
18.

The Court believes that the house in South Ogden
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may have been a sentimental item to decedent that he thought had
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connections with his previous family and he thought they should
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dispose of it and dispose of the proceeds of the sale, because
they all helped build it.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court arrives
at the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That decedent intended to provide for his second

spouse, LOLA BARTELL, outside of the Will.

He did this by

transferring assets to her in the sum of $230,160.41.
well provided for.

She is

The property that was not placed in her

name or in joint tenancy will be probated under decedent's
Will dated in 1963.
DATED this
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Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law
Probate No. 15771
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to George K. Fadel,
Attorney for Petitioner Lola Bartell, at 170 West Fourth South,
Bountiful, Utah 84010, this
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day of June, 1985.

Secretary
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C. Gerald Parker
Attorney for Personal Representative
2610 Washington Boulevard
P. 0. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: 399-3303
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
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ERNEST ALBIN BARTELL, a/k/a
ERNEST A. BARTELL, a/k/a
EARNEST A. BARTELL,
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Probate No. 15771

Deceased.
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The petition of LOLA BARTELL, pursuant to which she
is seeking to be declared an "omitted spouse" under Title 75-2-301
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, came on regularly for hearing
on the 31st day of May, 1985, before the Honorable David E. Roth,
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court sitting without a
jury.

The petitioner, LOLA BARTELL, appeared in person and was

represented by her counsel, GEORGE K. FADEL.

ALMA ALKEMA, the

Personal Representative of decedent's estate, appeared in person
and was represented by his counsel, C. Gerald Parker.

The Court

heard evidence introduced on behalf of both the petitioner and
the.jsaid Personal Representative, and being fully advised in the
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EXHIBIT B

premises, said Court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, pursuant to which an Order is to be entered; now by virtue
of the law and premises, in accordance with the facts found and
conclusions of law aforesaid, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the Petition of LOLA BARTELL seeking to be

declared an "omitted spouse11 under Title 75-2-301 of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code, is hereby denied, and the property which
o
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was not placed in the name of said petitioner by decedent during
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his lifetime, or which he did not place in joint tenancy with her,
is hereby ordered to be probated under decedent's Will dated
January 11, 1963.
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Judge
APPROVEP AS TO FORM:

George "K. ^Fadel
Attorney for Petitioner
Lola Bartell
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Order to George K. Fadel, Attorney for Petitioner Lola Bartell, at
170 West Fourth South, Bountiful, Utah 84010, this
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# * l e , 1985.
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75-2-206

INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND WILLS

and equitable as long as it was before
distribution of tbe estate. In re Thurman's Estate, 13 U. (2d) 156, 369 P. 2d
925.
m

Prior judgment not proof of marriage,
Judgment, in action against estate, declaring one claiming dower to be widow

of deceased was not binding on grantees
of decedent in action by widow to establish dower in land conveyed to grantees,
and judgment was not admissible to
prove her marriage. Hilton v. Snyder,
37 u. 384, 108 P. 698, Ann. Cas. 1912C,
241.

75-2-206. Effect of election on benefits by will or statute.—A surviving spouse is entitled to homestead allowance, exempt property, and
family allowance, whether or not he elects to take an elective share.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-206, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §3.

of benefits under the will (in the absence
of renunciation) because those benefits
are charged against the elective share
under sections 75-2-201, 75-2-202 and
75-2-207(1).

Editorial Board Comment
The election does not result in a loss

75-2-207. Charging spouse with gifts received—Liability of others
for balance of elective share.—(1) In the proceeding for an elective
share, values included in the augmented estate which pass or have passed
to the surviving spouse, or which wrould have passed to the surviving
spouse but were renounced, are applied first to satisfy the elective share
and to reduce any contributions due from other recipients of transfers
included in the augmented estate.
(2) Remaining property of the augmented estate is so applied that
liability for the balance of the elective share of the surviving spouse is
equitably apportioned among the recipients of the augmented estate in
proportion to the value of their interests therein.
(3) Only original transferees from, or appointees of, the decedent
and their donees, to the extent the donees have the property or its
proceeds, are subject to the contribution to make up the elective share
of the surviving spouse. A person liable to contribution may choose to
give up the property transferred to him or to pay its value as of the
time it is considered in computing the augmented estate.
History: C 1953, 75-2-207, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3; L. 1977, ch. 194,
§ "•
Compiler's Notes
rm_ ../*rr„
*J
x * x*. x , «_
The 1977 amendment substituted "recipients of transfers" near the end of
subsec. (1) for "recipients or transfers."

Editorial Board Comment
Sections 75-2-401, 75-2-402 and 75-2403 have the effect of giving a spouse
certain exempt property and allowances
*n addition to the amount of the elective
share,

Part 3
Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Wills
75-2-301. Omitted spouse.—(1) If a testator fails to provide by will
for his surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution
of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the estate
he would have received if the decedent left no will unless it appears from
the will that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for
52

EXHIBIT C

SPOUSE AND CHILDREN

75-2-302

the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer
be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the
testator or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence,
(2) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made
by the will abate as provided in section 75-3-9 02.
History: C 1953, 75-2-301, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3.
T3J-* • t »
J r*
*
Editorial Board Comment.
Section 75-2-508 provides that a will is
not revoked by a change of circumstances
occurring subsequent to its execution
other than as described by that section.
This section reflects the view that the
intestate share of the spouse is what the
decedent would want the spouse to have
if he had thought about the relationship
of his old will to the new situation. The

effect of this section should be to reduce the number of instances where a
spouse will claim an elective share.
Collateral References. <
Descent and Distribution S=>52.
26A CJ.S. Descent and Distribution
§ 49.
23 Am. Jur. 2d 851, Descent and Distribution § 108.
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic
Service, Uniform Probate Code.

75-2-302. Pretermitted children.—(1) If a testator fails to provide
in his will for any of his children or issue of a deceased child, the
omitted child or issue receives a share in the estate equal in value to
that which he would have received if the testator had died intestate
unless:
(a) It appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
(b) When the will was executed the testator had one or more
children and devised substantially all his estate to or for the exclushv.
benefit of the other parent of the omitted child, or of the deceased child
whose issue are omitted; or
(c) The testator provided for the child or issue by transfer outside
the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision is shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of
the transfer or other evidence.
(2) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to
provide in his will for a living child solely because he believes the
child to be dead, the child receives a share in the estate equal in value
to that which he would have received if the testator had died intestate.
(3) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made
by the will abate as provided in section 75-3-902.
(4) If the issue of a deceased child takes the share of the deceased
child under section 75-2-605, the issue shall not be considered pretermitted and shall not receive a share of the estate under this section.
(5) If it appears from the will that the omission of a child of the
testator was intentional and if no express provision is made in the
will for the issue of the child, the testator will be considered to have
intended to also omit the issue.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-302, enacted by the exclusive benefit of" and "whose
L 1975, ch. 150, § 3; L. 1977, ch. 194, § 9. issue are omitted" in subd. (1) (b); and
„
., . _
added subsecs. (4) and (5).
Compiler's Notes.
The 1977 amendment inserted "or for
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HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES v. UNIONAMERICA, INC,

Utah 743

Ote as, Utah, 657 P-2d 743

itoewhat lower than those of other appraisers and therefore could have been used
1
Tdiow that the value of the land plaintiffs
ated was even less in relationship to the
tie of all the land, thus making their plan
Ippear more equitable. The court sustained defendants' objection to his testimony, apparently on the grounds that he had
(jeen one of the initial referees in the partii suit and prior to that had been a confiatial adviser to one of defendants' attor1
We pass over the potential attorneyat privilege problems that might have
had Kiepe testified because we are
Satisfied that even if the exclusion were
grroneous, the decree still could not be refersei The exclusion of evidence is harmesa, "unless . . . the excluded evidence
tfould probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different veror finding." Utah REvid. 5. We do
believe Kiepe's testimony would have
1 that effect. Plaintiffs called three othjjtwitnesses who testified on the property
ilues; one more would not have substantially affected the outcome.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the trial court's findings of fact
ire supported by substantial evidence and
there is no basis in law for reversing the
decree of partition except for the manner in
which the sale of the Old Ranch property is
to be conducted. Accordingly, the trial
court's judgment and decree of partition is
*n all respects affirmed, except with respect
to the manner of selling the Old Ranch
property. We reverse and remand so that
the trial court may modify the order of sale
to
provide for the sale of the Old Ranch
P^perty in a manner consistent with this
"pinion. Costs to respondents.
OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ, and
HOMER F. WILKINSON, District Judge,
concur.
HALL C.J.. does not participate herein.

HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,

UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corporation,
aka Westmor; Ramshire, Inc., a corporation; William R. Stevenson; Park
City Reservations, a corporation, dba
Skyline Realty; Harry F. Reed; and
Gary Cole, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 17359.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec 14, 1982.

Listing broker brought action against
vendor and selling broker for alleged breach
of a fee splitting arrangement. The Third
District Court, Summit County, James S.
Sawaya, J., determined that listing broker
was entitled to a commission, but awarded
60% of that commission to selling broker,
and listing broker appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) selling
broker fully performed obligations required
of it under the fee splitting arrangement
between parties and, as a procuring cause
of the sale, was entitled to 60% of the
commission; (2) vendor had no duty to refer all "walk-in" inquiries to listing broker
and, hence, selling broker could not have
breached any duty by its failure to inform
listing broker that a "walk-in" buyer had
been referred from vendor; (3) denial of
punitive damages was not error in absence
of evidence of constructive fraud, conspiracy, conversion or intentional infliction of
mental distress; and (4) attorney fees were
not recoverable when listing broker rested
its case without presenting or proffering
evidence on issue.
Affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error e=>931(l), 1010.1(6)
The Supreme Court must presume that
a trial court's findings of fact are correct
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and, if they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record, will not overturn
them and must view the evidence and all
inferences that might reasonably be made
from the evidence in a light most favorable
to the judgment entered.

such, owes a fiduciary duty to the principal
but aside from the principal's duty to act in
good faith in the execution of the brokerage
contract, there is no reciprocal fiduciary
duty running from the principal to the broker.

2. Brokers <&=>66
Finding that selling broker fully performed the obligations required of it under
a fee splitting agreement with the listing
broker and, hence, was entitled to 60% of
the commission as the procuring cause of
the sale of real estate in question was supported by substantial evidence in record.

8. Fraud <&=»7
A fiduciary or confidential relationship
may be created by contract or by circumstances where equity will imply a higher
duty in a relationship because the trusting
party has been induced to relax the cars
and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise.

3. Pretrial Procedure <s=»434
Local rule requiring that all documents
be filed with court 30 days prior to commencement of trial did not justify delay
until last day of trial in introducing document allegedly evidencing defendant real
estate broker's lack of capacity, where document was available ten days before trial,
as rule specified that nothing therein should
preclude or limit voluntary exchange of information or discovery, with result that rule
had no application.
4. Pretrial Procedure <&=>751
Failure of listing broker to take advantage of opportunity afforded under rules of
giving notice before trial of its defense
against selling broker of lack of capacity
was to be taken as a waiver of that defense.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 9(a)(1), 15(a).
5. Parties <&=»76(1)
If the party against whom the defense
of lack of capacity is asserted has notice
and an opportunity to respond, the issue
need not be raised specifically in the pleadings, but the notice must be definite and
clear. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 9(aXl).
6. Parties <8=>76(1)
Pleading illegality and lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction do not put a party on
notice to respond to a defense of lack of
capacity. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 9(aXl).
7. Brokers <&=>11, 19
A real estate broker is an agent of the
property owner for whom he acts and, as

9. Fraud e=>7
For a fiduciary or confidential relation,
ship to arise, the evidence must demonstrate the placement of trust and reliance
such that the nature of the relationship is
clear.
10. Compromise and Settlement <s=>15(l)
No extraordinary duty ran from vendor
to listing broker beyond ordinary duty of
good faith in performance of contracts, not*
withstanding language of settlement agreement between parties, where settlement
agreement resulted from a previous suit
brought by broker against vendor for alleged breach of contract and tortious conduct and, as such, placed parties in adversarial postures which did not suggest confidence or trust.
11. Contracts <s=> 143.5
When a question arises regarding a
written document, the first source of inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its entirety.
12. Contracts <&=>1
Persons dealing at
entitled to contract on
without intervention of
either party from effects

arm's length are
their own terms
courts to relieve
of a bad bargain

13. Contracts <&=>143(3)
A court will not rewrite a contract to
supply terms which the parties omitted
14. Brokers <&=>11
Exclusive listing agreement between
vendor and listing broker could not be con-3
strued as requiring vendor to refer aB
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"walk-in" buyers to listing broker inasmuch
$s agreement contemplated the split of
commissions between listing and selling
brokers, and, hence, did not make listing
broker the sole and exclusive agent for the
jrendor.
15. Appeal and Error <s=»931(l), 1011.1(6)
Where the evidence is in conflict, the
Supreme Court must defer to the trial
court's firsthand assessment of the witnesses' credibility and assume that the trial
court believed those aspects of the evidence
which support its findings.
16. Brokers <s=>66
Selling broker did not breach any duty
"under its fee splitting agreement with listing broker by its failure to inform latter
that a "walk-in" buyer had been referred
from vendor and, hence, was not liable to
fisting broker for compensatory damages
since, regardless of characterization given
to relationship between brokers, vendor had
no duty to refer "walk-in" inquiries to listing broker.
17. Damages <s=>89(2)
A breach of contract, standing alone,
does not call for punitive damages, even if
intentional and unjustified, but if there is
8ome independent tort indicating malice,
fraud or wanton disregard for rights of
others, such damages are allowable.
18. Damages <s=»89(2)
Refusal to award punitive damages in
broker's action against vendor and
selling broker was not error since there was
Bo evidence of a breach of a fiduciary duty
<* a duty to act in good faith and no
evidence of constructive fraud, conspiracy,
conversion or intentional infliction of mental distress.
19. Costs <s=*207
Failure to award listing broker an attorney's fee for its recovery against vendor
a
nd selling broker of a partial commission
under a fee splitting arrangement was not
***OT where listing broker rested its case
Without presenting or proffering evidence
*>n issue and neither sought nor obtained
leave of court to reopen its case at a later
time for that purpose.

Kent B. Linebaugh, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant
James A. Boevers, F.S. Prince, Jr., Stephen G. Crockett, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
DURHAM, Justice:
This case is an appeal by the plaintiff/appellant from a judgment by the Third District Court for Summit County following a
trial to the court The district court awarded to the plaintiff, Hal Taylor Associates
(HTA), a real estate listing broker's commission of 6% on the sale of defendant
Unionamerica's real property at the price of
$1.6 million, and awarded 60% of that commission to defendant Park City Reservations (PCR) as the selling brokers in the
transaction.
In 1977, HTA and Unionamerica settled a
previous dispute with a Settlement Agreement dated February 17, 1977. This agreement specified that for the following five
years, Unionamerica would enter into "exclusive listing agreements" with HTA for
the sale of its Summit County properties,
that HTA would perform the "usual real
estate broker activities," and that HTA
would receive a commission of 6%. The
agreement then stated that: "Taylor will
further agree to a fee-splitting arrangement giving 60% to the selling broker and
40% to the listing broker." The Agreement
was signed by William R. Stevenson for
Unionamerica and by Hal Taylor for HTA.
Within hours, Unionamerica and HTA entered into a listing agreement for a 10.5
acre piece of property known as the "Village Land" in Park City. This form agreement made HTA the listing broker but did
not mention the 60/40 split provided for in
the Settlement Agreement At that time,
such a splitting of the broker's commission
was the usual practice in Park City when
the property was sold by a broker other
than the listing broker. The Settlement
Agreement was silent as to whether Unionamerica was obligated to refer all "walkins"—prospective buyers who voluntarily
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approach the owner—to HTA. In a pretrial
order, the court specifically found that
there was no express or implied agreement
regarding "walk-ins" in the Settlement
Agreement

13. Broker's Commission. The parties
hereto agree that at the time of initial
closing of this transaction, the entire broker's commission . . . shall be due and
payable by Seller, said commission being
in the amount of $96,000. The parties
On October 3, 1977, Mr. and Mrs. Jack
determined
that $57,600 of this eommisDavis traveled from California to Park City
sion
shall
be
payable to [PCR], the selling
to see the Village property. They had
broker,
and
$38,400 of this commission
heard of the property from one of Unionshall
be
payable
to Hal Taylor & Assoc*,
america's officers in California. Arrangeates,
the
listing
broker.
Should any disments had been made through Unionameripute
arise
between
the
brokers,
the entire
ca for Stevenson, a Unionamerica agent, to
commission
shall
be
retained
by
an esmeet the Davises in Park City. Stevenson
crow
agent
in
an
interest
bearing
account
called HTA, but Taylor was out of town.
untfl settlement or resolution of the matStevenson then called PCR and arranged to
ter by the brokers.
have its representatives meet with him and
Apparently, there was heated discussion of
the Davises. The initial meeting and viewthis provision which resulted in conflicting
ing of the property took place on October 4,
testimony at trial. The defendants asserted
1977. On October 8, 1977, PCR notified
that on behalf of HTA, Taylor orally agreed
HTA that they had shown the Village propto paragraph 13; Taylor claimed that he
erty to a prospective buyer without menagreed only to the sale of the property but
tioning to HTA that the prospective buyer
that he specifically disagreed with parahad been referred by Unionamerica. A
graph 13. The trial court made no finding
week later, after the Davises had orally
with regard to the existence of an agreeexpressed a desire to buy the property, PCR
ment In any event, Taylor left the meetasked for and received from Taylor an oral
ing without signing the agreement
confirmation of the 60/40 split in the event
At the time of the "initial closing" in May
of a sale.
of 1978, Unionamerica placed the entire
On October 17,1977, the PCR representa- $96,000 commission in an interest bearing
tives went to California where they negoti- escrow account Taylor and HTA filed suit
ated an Earnest Money Agreement which on June 15, 1978. Until the defendants
was signed by the buyer and Unionamerica filed their answers, none of the parties ever
on the same day. On October 19,1977, this contended that HTA was not entitled to at
agreement was delivered to Taylor who least 40% of the commission.
then asked how PCR had found the buyer.
At trial, the plaintiffs argued thatUM
The PCR representative told Taylor that
Settlement Agreement between Unionani
Davis had been contacted while skiing in
erica and HTA was orally modified so thai
Park City. Taylor subsequently learned,
Unionamerica was obligated to refer "walk
however, that the Davises had been reins" to HTA; that regardless of any modrfir
ferred to PCR by Unionamerica. On Octocation, Unionamerica had a fiduciary*!*
ber 24, 1977, Taylor notified PCR and Ungood faith duty to do so; that PCR bread
ionamerica that he felt HTA was entitled to
ed a duty to HTA by its concealment ol
the entire 6% commission because UnionamUnionamerica's referral; that the defend
erica should have referred the buyer to
ants conspired in order to harm HTA;*th«
HTA.
for lack of capacity, PCR could not counteg
Later in the day on October 24,1977, the claim for 60% of the commission becauS
parties and Mr. Davis met in the offices of PCR had failed to file an assumed nam
Unionamerica's attorneys to sign a real es- certificate authorizing PCR to do busmen
tate agreement for the sale of the property. as Skyline Realty, under which name PG|
Paragraph 13 of the agreement provided: had acted; and that Unionamerica fill
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breached its agreements with HTA and acted unreasonably and in bad faith when it
held the entire commission in escrow.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the trial court found: that the Settlement and Listing Agreements between Unionamerica and HTA were not orally modified, nor did they contain any express or
implied provision requiring Unionamerica to
refer "walk-ins" to HTA; that there was no
factual basis for finding any conspiracy,
Breach of a duty to act in good faith, breach
of fiduciary duty, or any other tort against
'any party; that by waiting until almost the
close of trial, HTA waived the defense of
lack of capacity against PCR's counterclaim
for 60% of the commission: and that Unionamerica acted reasonably by placing the
entire commission in escrow. The judgment awarded the entire 6% commission to
HTA, awarded 60% of that commission to
PCR from HTA, and awarded no attorney's
fees to any party.
The plaintiff and appellant, HTA, raises
four points on appeal. First, HTA claims
that the trial court erred in awarding a
selling broker's commission to PCR because
(a) there was insufficient evidence to establish that PCR was the "procuring cause" of
the sale and (b) PCR's lack of capacity
should have barred its claim. Second, even
if PCR was entitled to 60% of the commission from HTA, HTA claims that it was
entitled to compensatory damages from Unionamerica in an amount equal to that
awarded to PCR because (a) Unionamerica
breached a fiduciary duty to HTA, and (b)
there was an implied agreement that Unionamerica would refer "walk-ins" to HTA.
Third, HTA asserts that the trial court
erred in failing to award punitive damages
to HTA from each defendant. Finally,
HTA contends that the trial court erred in
failing to award to HTA attorney's fees
against Unionamerica. We address these
issues in the above order.
1
[1,2] In its Findings of Fact, the trial
court found that the defendant, PCR, "fully
performed the obligations required of a selling broker under the fee splitting agreet^

ment
" and therefore, PCR was entitled to 60% of the commission. It is HTA's
contention that the property was actually
sold to the buyer by the owners, Unionamerica, and that PCR did not perform acts
sufficient to become the "procuring cause"
of the sale. HTA quotes from Frederick
May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d
266 (1962), which discusses the factors involved in "procuring cause." This Court
said:
However, the extent to which the broker's efforts must induce the sale depends
on the terms used in the contract and the
understanding and intention of the parties in making such agreement and the
facts and circumstances of the case.
Id. at 43, 368 P.2d at 269 (emphasis added).
HTA places great emphasis on the necessity
for the initial contact with the buyer, but it
is clear from Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn,
and other cases cited by PCR, that no single
act will constitute procuring cause under all
circumstances. In this case, the trial court
heard the evidence regarding PCR's functions as a broker and found that PCR performed all the obligations of a selling broker. It is well established that this Court ]
will presume findings of fact to be correct /
and will not overturn them so long as they (
are supported by substantial evidence in ther^
record. See, e,g, PiacitelH v. Southern^
Utah State College, Utah, 636 P.2d 1063
(1981). The Court must view the evidence^
and all inferences that might reasonably be /
made from the evidence in a light mostr
favorable to the judgment entered. See)
Id; Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, Utah, 613
P.2d 512 (1980). The trial court heard ample evidence to support its finding: the
record shows that PCR traveled to California, negotiated and drafted an earnest money agreement, assisted in the negotiation of
the real estate agreement, and for many
months thereafter expended considerable
effort to bring the sale to a close. On the
basis of this evidence, the findings of the
trial court that PCR was entitled to a selling broker's portion of the commission must
be affirmed.
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[3,4] HTA also contends that, even if
PCR earned the seller's commission, PCR is
barred from asserting its claim because of
its lack of capacity. On the last day of
trial, HTA introduced, as evidence of PCR's
lack of capacity, a certificate from the Secretary of State which indicated that a
search had been made and no record existed
that PCR had ever filed to use the name
Skyline Realty. This certificate was dated
January 4,1980, 26 days before it was introduced at trial. For 26 days, HTA knew of
this document but failed to make use of it
or give notice of the problem regarding
capacity to opposing counsel. HTA claimed
that local Rule 10 of the Third District
Court prevented the giving of notice. Rule
10 specifies that discovery proceedings, the
filing of documents with the court, and all
pretrial motions must be completed 30 days
before commencement of trial. However,
the rule also states that the right to conduct
discovery within the 30-day period is at the
discretion of the court and that nothing in
the rule "shall preclude or limit voluntary
exchange of information or discovery
"
Thus, Rule 10 has no application here. Furthermore, Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that a party may
amend his pleading by leave of the court or
consent of the adverse party and that such
leave "shall be freely given when justice so
requires." There is nothing in the record
which suggests that HTA made any attempt to amend its pleading to conform
with Rule 9(aXl) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that the defense
of lack of capacity be raised by specific
negative averment When HTA obtained
the Secretary of State's certificate, there
were 10 days remaining before commencement of trial, ample time for PCR to respond to such an amendment In view of
the circumstances and the provisions of the
rules discussed, it is clear that HTA had the
opportunity to give notice of its defense of
lack of capacity. HTA chose not to do so.
Thus, we hold that the trial court was correct in ruling that HTA waived this defense*
[5,6] It should be noted that notice and
the resulting opportunity to respond are the

critical factors in requiring compliance with
Rule 9(aXl). If the party against whom
the defense is asserted has notice and an
opportunity to respond, the issue need not
be raised specifically in the pleadings. See
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 899 (1958). It
must be emphasized, however, that the no.
tice must be definite and clear. The «j*
sponding party need not guess what hidden
defenses may be raised. HTA asserts that
because "illegality" was plead as an affirmative defense and because subject matter
jurisdiction may be contested at any tunS
HTA's defense of lack of capacity was p ^
served. Pleadings of illegality and lack a?
subject matter jurisdiction do not put a
party on notice to respond to a defense of
lack of capacity. Were we to rule otherwise, Rule 9(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Gig
Procedure would become a nullity.
HTA also argues on appeal that HTA
should receive compensatory damages from
PCR in the amount of the 60% portion of
the commission because of PCR's alleged
breach of fiduciary or good faith dutyfai
failing to disclose the referral from Unioaamerica. This question will be discussed
below in conjunction with the existence of £
fiduciary relationship between HTA ao^
Unionamerica.
2
[7] The major issue in this appeal, ft
well as at trial, is whether a fiduciary film
tionship existed between HTA and Union?
america. In Utah, as elsewhere, a real 4 «
tate broker is held to be the agent of t&i
property owner for whom he acts. JUii
agent, he owes a fiduciary duty to his p
cipal. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Wardley I
Utah, 611 P.2d 1204 (1980). However, jflj
generally recognized that no reciprocal duW
runs from the principal to the broker. JCMf
principal's duty to his broker is one of goo(
faith in the execution of the brokerage r~
tract which established the relation
We find no Utah law which would raiseJL
good faith duty to the higher standarijSB
posed on those with fiduciary responsfljffl
ities.
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[S-10] A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be created by contract or by
drcumstances where equity will imply a
Irigher duty in a relationship because the
irusting party has been induced to relax the
care and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise. In such a case, the evidence must
demonstrate the placement of trust and reliance such that the nature of the relationship is clear. See, e.g.t Arnoult v. Griffin,
Tenn.App., 490 S.W.2d 701 (1972). In the
instant case, the relationship between HTA
and Unionamerica was created by the Settlement and Listing Agreements. The record reveals no basis for implying a relationship of special reliance and trust To the
contrary, the record reveals that these parties found it necessary to enter into the
Settlement Agreement because of a previous suit brought by Taylor alleging breach
of contract and tortious conduct Adversarial postures in a lawsuit do not suggest
confidence or trust We find that Unionamerica owed no fiduciary duty to its broker, HTA, based on the circumstances of
their relationship. Neither do we find that
the language of the Settlement Agreement
or Listing Agreement created any extraordinary duty to HTA beyond the ordinary
duty of good faith in the performance of
contracts.
[11-14] HTA also alleges error in the
pretrial order which found no implied provision in either of the parties' agreements
requiring Unionamerica to refer all "walkin" buyers to HTA. When a question arises
regarding a written document, the first
source of inquiry must be the document
Hself, considered in its entirety. See Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., Utah, 614
P.2d 160 (1980). Neither of the agreements
contain any express mention of "walk-ins".
It is a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to
contract on their own terms without the
intervention of the courts to relieve either
party from the effects of a bad bargain.
See, e.g, Biesinger v. Behunin, Utah, 584
P.2d 801 (1978). This Court will not rewrite
& contract to supply terms which the parties
omitted. See Tomino v. Greater Park City
Co., Utah, 570 P 2d 698 (1977). HTA and

Unionamerica were experienced in their
business and had every reason to protect
themselves in entering into the settlement
of a lawsuit The Settlement Agreement
clearly does not make HTA the sole and
exclusive agent for Unionamerica, because
it contemplates the split of commissions between listing and selling brokers. We find
no implied provision regarding the referral
of "walk-in" buyers. "(T]t is not for a court
to rewrite a contract improvidently entered
into at arm's length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed
equitable principles." Dalton v. Jerzco Construction Co., Utah, 642 P2d 748, 750 (1982)
(citations omitted). The order and findings
of the trial court in this regard are affirmed.
[15] At trial, HTA contended that the
Settlement and Listing Agreements were
orally modified by discussion at the time
the Settlement Agreement was signed.
Conflicting testimony was heard by the
court Where the evidence is in conflict, we j
defer to the trial court's first-hand assess-/
ment of the witnesses' credibility and as-*
sume that the trial court believed those p
aspects of the evidence which support its\
findings. See, e.g., Fillmore City v. Reeve, \
Utah, 571 P.2d 1316 (1977). The trial court
found no oral modification requiring Unionamerica to refer "walk-in" buyers to HTA.
Such a finding of fact will not be disturbed
by this Court where there is supporting
evidence in the record. See Piacitelli v.
Southern Utah State College, supra. The
finding is therefore affirmed.
In summary, we hold that Unionamerica
had no fiduciary duty to protect HTA by
referring all inquiries to HTA exclusively.
Further, we have found no express or implied requirement to do so in the parties'
written agreements and no oral modification to that effect Because there was no
duty, there was no breach. Therefore, we
affirm the trial court's refusal to award
HTA compensatory damages from Stevenson and Unionamerica in the amount of the
commission awarded to PCR.
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[16] If Unionamerica had no duty ^ gard for the rights of others. See also Doltf
refer all "walk-in" inquiries to HTA, th e n v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Haw. 18, 501 Pjy
regardless of the characterization given to 368 (1972); Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chev.
the ra)Mj£>72sh}p between BTA 22>d J*Qft
/v/et Cb., 227 Kan. 45, 605 P.2d 95 (1980f
PCR cannot have breached any duty by j ^ Jackson v. Glasgow, OkLApp., 622 P.2d 1088
failure to inform HTA that the buyer had
(1980).
been referred from Unionamerica. T h s ^
fore, we also affirm the trial court's r e f u ^
[18] In the instant case, HTA alleged
to award to HTA compensatory damage breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty
from PCR.
to act in good faith, constructive fraud,
3
[17] The appellant, HTA, claims error j n
the trial court's refusal to award puniti ve
damages. HTA acknowledges the g e n e ^
rule that punitive or exemplary dama^es
are generally not recoverable in contr^ct
actions. However, HTA cites our opinion j n
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., Utah, 585 P.2d ?75>
778 (1978), for the proposition that "the
nature and type of the wrongful conduct"
should determine whether punitive da*n_
ages should be awarded. In applying thj s
statement to the instant case in support 0f
an award of punitive damages, HTA re^jg
Nasi too broadly. In Nash, the plaintiff
prayed for and received an equitable rerr^
dy but was denied punitive damages by t^ e
trial court Our opinion discussed the av^jj.
ability of punitive damages in an equitafye
action and the relationship between t^ e
amount of punitive damages awarded a ^
the amount of compensatory damage
That discussion is inapposite here. It fe
true that in some jurisdictions punitiye
damages may be awarded in cases involving
contracts where the breaching party's CQn.
duct is characterized by extreme bad faity,
malice or recklessness. See, e.g., Tac^t
Club Sales & Service, Inc. v. First Natio^
Bank of North Idaho, 101 Idaho 852, 633
P.2d 464 (1980); State Farm General Ins^
ance Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P^j
798 (1974). We prefer the standard arti(vu.
Isted by the K&tzs£f Supreme Ge&tix 6&nm.
zalez v. Allstate Insurance Co., 217 Ka^
262, 535 P.2d 919 (1975), which states t h a t
breach of contract, standing alone, does n 0 t
call for punitive damages even if intention.
al and unjustified, but such damages a r e
allowable if there is some independent t o ^
indicating malice, fraud or wanton disr^

conspiracy, conversion and intentional infliction of mental distress. We have already found that neither Unionamerica nor
PCR breached a duty which would warrant
the award of compensatory damages. The
trial court found that there was no factual
basis to support the allegations of other
tortious conduct. Our review of the record
leads us to the same conclusion and thus we
affirm the trial court's finding. Therefore,
having found no independent tort, we see
no basis for the award of punitive damages
in this contract case and affirm the denial
of punitive damages by the tria) court
4
[19] Finally, HTA alleges error in the
trial court's failure to award attorney's fees
for the recovery of its 40% portion of the
commission, and error in the trial court's
finding that Unionamerica acted reasonably
in depositing the entire commission in escrow. However, the propriety of the escrow deposit was not addressed as an issue
at trial, nor is it raised as an issue on this
appeal. In fact, Unionamerica sought pretrial relief in the nature of interpleader,
and although its motion therefor was de*
nied, the district court sanctioned the prior
deposit of the commission funds in escroy;
and further ordered the funds to be main^
tained in an interest bearing account Ifo
appeal was taken from that order. Purthermore, a review of the trial transcript
reveals that HTA did not address the issote
of attorney's fees at trial, beyond reference
to it in counsel's opening statement »\Jtj
rested its case without presenting or prof|
fering evidence on the issue, and it neither
sought nor obtained leave of court to.reg
open its case at a later time for that p i 3

HORGAN v. INDUSTRIAL DESIGN CORP.

Utah

751

Cite as, Utah, 657 P.2d 751

pose. In accord with the well-established
rule of law that requires an award of attorney's fees to be supported by evidence, the
trial court did not commit error in declining
to make an award.
The actions of the trial court are therefore affirmed. No costs awarded.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.
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Jack E. HORGAN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, Abe W. Mathews
Engineering Corporation, a Minnesota
Corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 18104.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec 29, 1982.
Former employee brought action
against his former employer seeking to recover additional compensation following his
termination. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., granted
summary judgment in favor of former employers on basis of a release executed by the
parties, and former employee appealed.
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that
former employee did not sign the mutual
Release under duress and therefore the rekase was valid and enforceable and barred
^ployee's suit
Affirmed.
*• Judgment <$=> 181(2)
Mere existence of genuine issues of
ra
ct in the case as a whole does not pre-

clude entry of summary judgment if those
issues are immaterial to resolution of the
case.
2. Release <s=*18
Former employee was not compelled by
duress to sign a release in connection with
settlement reached with employers following his termination.
3. Release <3=»1
A release is a type of contract and may
generally be enforced or rescinded on the
same grounds as other contracts.
4. Release G=>1
Mere fact of an improvident or bad
bargain or a feeling of latent discontent is
not a sufficient basis to avoid effect of an
otherwise valid release.
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
William L. Crawford, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
On this appeal plaintiff Jack Horgan, a
former employee of the defendant corporations, seeks reversal of the trial court's adverse summary judgment in an action to
recover losses stemming from the termination of plaintiffs employment
Plaintiff began employment as an engineer with defendant Abe W. Mathews Engineering Corporation (AWMECO), a Minnesota corporation, in October 1957. In
1976 AWMECO acquired defendant Industrial Design Corporation (IDC), a Utah corporation. To assist in the supervision of
this newly acquired subsidiary, the AWMECO directors decided to transfer plaintiff
from Minnesota to Utah. Plaintiff agreed
to make the transfer, allegedly in reliance
upon oral assurances that all moving expenses would be paid, that he would receive
bonuses and options for stock in IDC, and
that he could eventually assume the presidency of IDC. Plaintiff subsequently
moved to Utah, was paid over $6,800.00 in
moving expenses, and went on the IDC
payroll July 1, 1977.
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A.2d 526 (1970), the court held that implied
in a lease for used residential apartment
space was a duty on the part of the landlord
to make repairs to vital facilities caused by
ordinary wear and tear. Several courts
have held that when determining whether
any implied covenants or warranties exist
in a sale or lease of real property, the intent
of the parties should be analyzed as should
the importance of the defective item to the
comfortable enjoyment of the premises.
See id.; Bermes v. Facell, La.App., 328
So.2d 722 (1976).
[9,10] In the case at hand, the plaintiff
complains that the trial court held the defendant liable only for those repair and
replacement costs necessary to bring the
air-conditioning system up to the proper
operating level of a used, 13-year-old system. The plaintiff knew the building and
the air-conditioning system were used. Although the doctrine of caveat emptor is
slightly modified in this case by the terms
of the contract, it is not abandoned. In
interpreting the terms of the contract, the
court must look to the agreement as a
whole, to the circumstances, nature and
purpose of the contract. Maw v. Noble, 10
Utah 2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 (1960); 17 Am.
Jur.2d Contracts §§ 245, 246. Thus, where
the parties bargained for the purchase of
the 13-year-old building and air-conditioning system, and the vendor agreed to keep
the premises in good condition and make all
necessary repairs and replacements, it can
reasonably be assumed that those repairs
and replacements were not to be of such a
nature as to require the vendor completely
to renovate the building. Those repairs and
replacements called for under the terms of
the contract were those required to maintain the building and air-conditioning system in an operational condition for a building and air-conditioning system of like age
and usage.

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Clyde
L. CHRISTENSEN, Deceased.
v.
Virginia T. CHRISTENSEN, Appellant
No. 17892.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 8, 1982.

Appeal was taken from a judgment of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
James S. Sawaya, J., granting executor's
motion to dismiss widow's petition under
"omitted spouse" statute. The Supreme
Court, Oaks, J., held that: (1) fact that
testator's bequest of corporate stock to widow before their marriage may not have
been made in contemplation of that marriage did not make widow an "omitted
spouse" under statute so as to entitle her to
50 percent of his estate; (2) there was
substantial support for conclusion that testator did not fail to provide by will for his
surviving spouse, and therefore "omitted
spouse" statute was inapplicable; and (3)
executor was equitably estopped from later
changing its position and asserting that
widow was barred from claim for automobile by court's order granting executor's
petition for confirmation of sale of personal
property by which automobile was sold.
Ordered accordingly.

1. Wills <s=*358
Order admitting will to probate in
course of formal testacy proceedings is final
order for purposes of appeal. U.CAJ953,
75-3-412(1).

Affirmed. Costs to defendant
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein; PALMER, District Judge, sat

EXHIBIT

2. Wills <e=*788
Trial court's dismissal of petition by
widow alleging she was entitled to 50 percent of testator's estate as an "omitted
spouse" under statute was a final appeals-
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ble order. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-301, 75-3412(1).
3. Wills <s=>785(l)
Fact that testator's bequest of corporate stock to widow prior to their marriage
may not have been made in contemplation
of that subsequent marriage did not render
widow an "omitted spouse" under statute so
as to entitle her to 50 percent of his estate.
U.CJL1953, 75-2-301.
4. Wills <s=>788
Where testamentary gift by testator to
spouse cannot be shown to have been made
in contemplation of marriage, surviving
spouse is permitted to show that in circumstances presented, including provision of
particular testamentary gift, testator failed
to provide by will for his surviving spouse
so as to make that spouse an "omitted
spouse" under statute; among considerations relevant to that factual conclusion
are: alternative takers under will, dollar
value of testamentary gift to surviving
spouse, fraction of estate represented by
that gift, whether comparable gifts were
made to other persons, length of time between execution of testamentary instrument and marriage, duration of marriage,
any inter vivos gifts testator has made to
surviving spouse, and separate property and
needs of surviving spouse. U.C.A.1953, 752-30L
5. Wills <s=»788
Burden of establishing that particular
testamentary gift did not "provide" for surviving spouse so as to render that spouse an
"omitted spouse" under statute is on surviving spouse; in order to satisfy that burden,
evidence must be sufficient to establish that
testamentary gift could not reasonably represent testator's effort to provide by will
for surviving spouse. U.C.A.1953, 75-230L
6. Wills te788
Where though amounting to only four
percent of total value of estate, widow's
$436,000 testamentary gift had substantial
dollar value, marriage occurred relatively
short time after execution of codicils in
which widow's testamentary gift was in-

eluded, marriage was extremely brief, and
record suggested that testator made significant inter vivos gifts to widow, there was
substantial support for conclusion that testator did not fail to provide by will for his
surviving spouse, and therefore "omitted
spouse" provision in statute was inapplicable. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-301.
7. Estoppel <3=»63
Where executor's trust officer telephoned widow's counsel, who informed him
that widow claimed ownership of automobile in question, where the two then agreed
that widow would not object to sale, but
would make claim to proceeds rather than
to automobile itself, and where apparently
neither communicated such agreement to
executor's attorney, executor was equitably
estopped from later changing its position
and asserting that widow's claim *&*
barred by court's order granting executor's
petition for confirmation of sale of personal
property by which automobile was sold.

David E. West, Frank Armstrong, Salt
Lake City, for appellant
David S. Geldzahler, John M. Bradley,
Salt Lake City, for respondent
OAKS, Justice:
Appellant, who married the 83-year-old
testator six weeks before his death, contends that she is entitled to 50 percent of
his $10 million estate as an "omitted
spouse" under U.C.A., 1953, § 75-2-301.
She claims the intestate share specified
where "a testator fails to provide by will
for his surviving spouse who married the
testator after the execution of the
will
" The district court granted the
executor's motion to dismiss appellant's petition on the ground that she was not an
omitted spouse because she was provided
for in the testator's will. (The court did not
resolve the executor's challenge to the validity of the marriage.) We affirm that
decision, but modify the court's judgment
on a lesser issue.
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Appellant and testator had occupied adjoining condominium units in Salt Lake
City since 1966. According to her affidavit,
she "cared and provided for him" and the
two "had a close relationship." Testator
executed his last will in 1976, leaving the
bulk of his estate in trust for the benefit of
his granddaughter.
In a codicil executed in 1977, the testator
bequeathed 3,000 shares of Norton Company stock to appellant. In a second codicil,
executed in 1979, he bequeathed 8,000
shares of this stock to appellant. The parties disagree whether the total bequest was
for 8,000 shares or for 11,000 shares, but
agree that the will, as modified by the
codicils, gave appellant at least 8,000 shares,
whose value at the date of death proved to
be $436,000.
The testator married the appellant, Virginia Thompson, on October 14, 1980, in
Elko, Nevada. The testator died November
26, 1980. He left an estate valued at over
$10 million. His will was admitted to probate and the respondent bank was appointed executor on December 24,1980. On that
same date, the court declared testator's
heirs to include "Virginia Thompson,"
whom the court described as a "Specific
Legatee and Alleged Spouse."
Although appellant did not contest this
order of the court, she later filed a petition
praying, inter alia, for a determination that
she was an omitted spouse under § 75-2301, and for an order awarding her the
proceeds of the sale of an automobile. The
executor moved to dismiss the petition.
Appellant filed a cross-motion for partial
summary judgment. The district court dismissed the petition insofar as it related to
both of appellant's contentions, and she
took this appeal.
I. FINAL JUDGMENT
A threshold question in this appeal is
whether the order of the district court dis1.

If a testator fails to provide by will for his
surviving spouse who married the testator
after the execution of the will, the omitted
spouse shall receive the same share of the
estate he would have received if the decedent
left no will unless it appears from the will

missing the petition of the "omitted spouse"
is a final appealable order. We hold that it
is.
[1] An order admitting a w ill to probate
in the course of formal testacy proceedings
is a final order for purposes of appeal
U.C.A., 1953, § 75-3-412(1); In re Estate
of Decker, 194 Colo. 143, 570 P.2d 832
(1977); New Topic Service Volume, Am.
Jur.2d Uniform Probate Code § 56 (1974).
[2] The order dismissing an omitted
spouse's petition is similar in that it resolves
an issue of vital importance and concludes a
major phase in the process of formal testacy proceedings. Failure to allow an appeal
from such an order could compel all subsequent proceedings, including partial distributions, to go forward under a cloud of
uncertainty that would seriously impair the
personal representative's efforts to administer the estate. The order is therefore final
for purposes of appeal.
II. PROVISION FOR SURVIVING
SPOUSE
[3] Section 75-2-301 of the Utah Probate Code, which is quoted in full in the
footnote and which is identical to the corresponding section of the Uniform Probate
Code,1 has never been construed by thia
Court, and has rarely been construed in
other jurisdictions. See annotations to Uniform Probate Code § 2-301, 8 U.LA. 131
(Supp.1982). The section is obviously designed to avoid the unintentional disinheritance of the spouse of a decedent who executed a will prior to the marriage and neglected to revise it afterwards. According
to the Editorial Board Comment, the section "reflects the view that the intestate
share of the spouse is what the decedent
would [have] wantfed] the spouse to have if
he had thought about the relationship of his
old will to the new situation."
that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer
be m lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown by statements of the testator or from
the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
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Appellant's contention that she is an
"omitted spouse" for whom the testator
w
fail[ed] to provide by will," § 75-2-301,
must be considered against the background
of the common law and succeeding statutes.
At common law, a man's will was revoked
by his subsequent marriage and birth of
issue. T. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law
of Wills § 85 (2d ed. 1953). Later legislation in England and most states in this
country provided that a man's will was revoked merely by marriage if his wife survived him and was not provided for by a
marriage settlement or in the will or otherwise mentioned so as to negate an intention
to revoke. See Bordwell, "The Statute Law
of Wills/' 14 Iowa L.Rev. 283, 298-301
(1929). Utah had such a statute from the
earliest days of statehood until it was repealed by enactment of the Uniform Probate Code. Utah Rev.Stats., 1898, § 2754;
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 74-1-24 and -25 (repealed). Although the Uniform Probate
Code does not achieve its result by specifying revocation of the will, its requirement
that an omitted spouse not provided for in
the will receive the share he or she would
have inherited by intestacy clearly reflects
a familiar and long-standing feature of the
law of wills.
Appellant contends that the testator's bequests of corporate stock in the 1977 and
1979 codicils do not constitute a "provision]
by will for his surviving spouse" that would
preclude the applicability of § 75-2-301 because (1) they were not made in contemplation of her marriage to the testator, and
(2) their value was too minimal in relation
to the overall value of the estate.
(1) Some statutes in force when the Uniform Probate Code was drafted specified
that in order to avoid the rule of revocation
by marriage a provision for the surviving
spouse must have been included in the will
to contemplation of marriage. In other
words, the will provision must have been
executed in favor of the recipient in his or
W capacity as a prospective spouse. Even
where there was no such requirement in the
statute, some cases have imposed that requirement, though others have not See
generally 2 W. Boyce & D. Parker, Page on

Wills § 21.91 (1960); Annot, 97 A.L.R.2d
1026 (1964); 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills §§ 582-583
(1975).
We are aware of no cases determining
whether a will provision in favor of a surviving spouse can preclude the applicability
of the "omitted spouse" provision in § 2 301 of the Uniform Probate Code (U.C.A.,
1953, § 75-2-301) where the testamentary
gift was not made in contemplation of marriage. Even though "contemplation of
marriage" figured prominently in prior
statutes and case law, the Uniform Probate
Code makes no mention of that legal requirement. In a statute so carefully drafted, that omission must have been deliberate. We think it would therefore be inappropriate for the "contemplation of marriage" requirement to be re-engrafted by
judicial decision. The interpretive problems
entailed in applying that requirement to
various testamentary dispositions, described
in Estate of Ganier, Fla.App., 402 So.2d 418,
421 n. 3 (1981), confirm the wisdom of
avoiding that requirement unless it is clearly imposed by statute. Here it is not
We therefore reject appellant's first argument and hold that a testator can "provide by will for his surviving spouse" in
such a way as to prevent the recipient from
being an "omitted spouse" under § 75-2301 even though the testamentary gift was
not made in contemplation of marriage.
This was the holding in a case that construed a statute with wording similar to
this provision of the Uniform Probate Code.
Estate of Ganier, supra. We find that reasoning persuasive of the same result in this
case.
(2) Appellant contends that even if the
testamentary gift need not be made in contemplation of marriage, by his bequest in
this case the testator "fail[ed] to provide by
will for his surviving spouse" within the
meaning of § 75-2-301 because of the relatively minimal value of the bequest Appellant argues that allowing a minimal bequest made years before marriage to effectively disinherit a spouse who would otherwise be entitled to an intestate share would
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contradict the underlying purpose of the
omitted spouse provision.
Section 75-2-301 is designed to effectuate, not to circumvent, the testator's intent.2 Pursuant to that purpose, the section
specifies the intestate share for the "omitted spouse" on the theory that it fairly
approximates what the testator would have
bequeathed if he had executed a will after
the marriage. But that theory is inapplicable where the will contains any bequest to
the spouse that is clearly made in contemplation of their marriage. As was well
stated by a California court:
The determinative fact is not the size
of the gift to the contemplated spouse
but the fact that the testator has made a
provision affirmatively showing that he
had the particular person in mind as a
contemplated spouse.
Estate of Bridler, 165 Cal.App.2d 486, 488,
331 P.2d 1028, 1029 (1958). To grant an
intestate share where the will contains a
gift made in contemplation of marriage
would contradict the testator's intent. In
that circumstance, the omitted spouse provision m § 75-2-301 would be inapplicable,
and the surviving spouse would be left to
pursue other statutory remedies.

[5] The burden of establishing that a
particular testamentary gift did not "provide" for the surviving spouse for purposes
of § 75-2-301 is on the surviving spouse.
In order to satisfy that burden, the evidence must be sufficient to establish that
the testamentary gift specified before the
marriage could not reasonably represent
this testator's effort "to provide by will for
his surviving spouse." § 75-2-301.

[4] The more difficult circumstance—
the one present in this case—is where the
Testamentary gift cannot be shown to have
been made in contemplation of marriage.
Here, the testator's intent cannot be dispositive on the treatment of the "omitted
spouse" because it is equivocal: he may
simply have neglected to amend his will
after marriage, or he may have re-examined the will and decided that his previous
testamentary gift would adequately provide
for his new spouse. In such a case, the
surviving spouse should be permitted to
show that in the circumstances presented,
including the provision of a particular testamentary gift, the testator "fail[ed] to provide by will for his surviving spouse" within
the meaning of § 75-2-301. Among the
considerations relevant to that factual con-

[6] In this case, the pending motions
made it evident that both parties were willing to submit the issue on the undisputed
facts before the district court. Though
amounting to only four percent of the total
value of the estate, appellant's $436,000 testamentary gift had a substantial dollar value, the marriage occurred a relatively short
time after the codicils were executed, the
marriage was extremely brief, and the record suggests that the testator made significant inter vivos gifts to appellant Consequently, there was substantial support for
the district court's conclusion that this was
not a case where the testator had "fail[ed]
to provide by will for his surviving spouse,"
and the omitted spouse provision in § 75-2301 was therefore inapplicable. The dis-

2. Contrast § 75-2-201, which entitles a surviving spouse to an elective share contrary to the

elusion are (1) the alternative takers under
the will, (2) the dollar value of the testamentary gift to the surviving spouse, (3) the
fraction of the estate represented by that
gift, (4) whether comparable gifts were
made to other persons, (5) the length of
time between execution of the testamentary instrument and the marriage, (6) the
duration of the marriage, (7) any inter vivos
gifts the testator has made to the surviving
spouse, and (8) the separate property and
needs of the surviving spouse. For example, if a testator's will made token gifts to
various friends, one of whom married the
testator years later, the original gift is not
likely to qualify as a "provision] by will for
his surviving spouse
"

testator's intent.
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missal of appellant's petition for relief as an
omitted spouse is therefore affirmed.3
III. PROCEEDS OF THE
AUTOMOBILE
[7] Appellant claims the proceeds of the
sale of a Lincoln Continental automobile.
The executor resists this claim on the
grounds that appellant made no objection to
the sale and the court confirmed i t The
circumstances are set forth in the undisputed affidavit of appellant's counsel: In an
attempt to locate the title certificate, the
executor's trust officer telephoned appellant's counsel, who informed him that appellant claimed ownership of this automobile. The officer responded that he had a
sale, but would not proceed in the face of
any adverse claim. The two then agreed
that appellant would not object to the sale,
but would make claim to the proceeds rather than to the automobile itself. Apparently neither communicated this agreement to
the executor's attorney. The court later
granted the executor's petition for confirmation of sale of personal property, and the
automobile was sold.
Appellant contends that the executor
should be estopped from raising the order
of the court as a defense to her claim. The
executor counters that appellant's counsel
acted improperly by communicating directly
with an adverse party, rather than its counsel, and therefore cannot invoke the doctrine of estoppel in this circumstance. The
executor's attorney claims prejudice in his
being deprived of the opportunity to determine whether to conduct the sale forthwith
or only after litigating the question of ownership to the automobile.

defendant was estopped to rely on the statute of limitations because its insurance carrier had induced the plaintiff to delay filing
her action. Quoting approvingly from an
earlier authority, we stated:
Where the delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the
defendant, . . . it cannot be availed of
. . . as a defense.
One cannot justly or equitably lull an
adversary into a false sense of security
thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of
limitations, and then be heard to plead
that very delay as a defense to the action
when brought.
23 Utah 2d at 28, 456 P.2d at 163. Similarly, in reasonable reliance upon an agreement with the executor, appellant refrained
from challenging its petition for confirmation of the sale of the automobile. The
executor is equitably estopped from later
changing its position and asserting that appellant is barred by the court's order.
Appellant is not precluded from invoking
equitable estoppel by her attorney's direct
contact with the executor's trust officer.
As appellant points out, the executor-bank
is a sophisticated organization and its trust
officer an experienced professional. The
contact, which was initiated by the bank,
was made in the course of the officer's
routine duties. In addition, we perceive no
prejudice resulting to the bank or its counsel from the sale of the automobile before,
rather than after, the contest over its ownership.
The dismissal of appellant's claim to the
proceeds of the automobile is therefore reversed, and this claim is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In other respects, the dismissal of appellant's petition is affirmed. No costs
awarded.

The circumstances of this case fit all the
elements of equitable estoppel, as specified
in Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc.,
HALL, CJ., STEWART and HOWE, JJ.,
Utah, 652 P.2d 1298 (1982); Rice v. Granite
and
J. DUFFY PALMER, District Judge,
School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159
concur.
(1969); and J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney
Co., Utah, 534 P.2d 903, 905 (1975). Thus,
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein Rice v. Granite School District, supra, the in; PALMER, District Judge, sat
3. In view of this disposition, it is unnecessary
for us to discuss the remaining provisions of
§ 75-2-301 or other issues pertaining to the

timeliness of appellant's petition, the penalty
clause of the will, or the executor's capacity to
attack the validity of the mamage.
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What constitutes transfer outside the will precluding surviving
spouse from electing statutory share under Uniform Probate Code
§ 2-301
TRANSFERS OUTSIDE W I L L — W I D O W ' S ALLOWANCE

The purpose of this annotation is
to collect and discuss the state and
federal cases wherein the courts determined whether a particular transfer
of money or property to a spouse
during a decedent's lifetime was intended to b e in lieu of a testamentary
provision for that spouse thereby precluding that spouse from claiming a
share of the decedent's estate by election u n d e r § 2-301 of the Uniform
Probate Code. 1
Since relevant statutes are stated or
discussed herein only insofar as they
are reflected in the reported cases
within the scope of the annotation,
the reader is advised to consult the
specific statutes of the particular jurisdiction in which he may be interested. 1
•
Recognizing the general rule to be
that a surviving spouse can elect to
take under a will, or to take against it
a certain share in the real and personal estate of the deceased spouse,
the drafters of the Uniform Probate
Code gave to a surviving spouse the
right to take an elective share of the
"augmented estate," and spelled out
the procedure for making the election
and satisfying the share. 8 However,
the drafters of the Code also recognized that a spouse may provide for
his spouse's future financial security
by making various pre-death transfers

of his real and personal property to
his spouse and that such transfers
might be intended to be in lieu of any
possible testamentary provisions that
spouse might make. For that reason,
the drafters of the Code provided in
§ 2-301 that if such a transfer was
made by a spouse prior to death with
the intention to provide for his survivor, or if it was clear that the survivor
was being intentionally omitted from
the testator's will, the surviving
spouse would be forbidden to take a
statutory share. T h u s , in the following case the court held that the testator had intended to provide for his
spouse by certain nontestamentary
transfers so that she, as the beneficiary of the nontestamentary transfers, was precluded from claiming an
additional share of the testator's estate.
Under §2-301(a) of the Uniform
Probate Code, as enacted by the state
of New Mexico, providing that should
a testator fail to provide by will fo. a
surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will,
the omitted spouse shall receive the
same share of the estate he would
have received if the decedent left no
will unless the testator provided for
the spouse by transfer outside the will
with the intent that the transfer be in
lieu of the testamentary provision, the
court, in Re Estate of Taggart (1980,

1. Section numbers of the Uniform Probate Code are represented herein, unless
otherwise stated, in the form in which
they appear in the Act as approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws.
2. For a list of the jurisdictions which
1214

have adopted the Uniform Probate Code,
see the latest supplement to the Am Jur
2d Desk Book, Item No. 124.
3. See, generally, the discussion in 80
Am Jur 2d, Wills §§ 1651 and 1652.

11 ALR4th

TRANSFERS OUTSIDE WILL—WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE
11 ALR4th 1213

App) 95 NM 117, 619 P2d 562, 11
ALR4th 1201, held that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the testator had
made certain transfers to his wife
outside his will and that those transfers were intended to be in lieu of a
testamentary provision for her. The
court noted that there were three
transfers to the spouse, namely, the
creation of a joint tenancy checking
account, the creation of a joint tenancy savings account, and the assignment of retirement benefits of approximately $400 per month to the
widow, all of which transfers when
taken together amounted to approximately 20 percent of rh** ^ ^ H e n i i
estate. The court rejected the widow's
argument that the joint tenancy
checking and savings accounts could
not be considered to have been transferred to her inasmuch as the
amounts in those accounts were being
used for the day-to-day expenses of
support for herself and her husband,
noting that the widow herself testified
that at the time of creating the joint
accounts her husband had stated that
he created them for her protection.
The court stated that inasmuch as the
testator's intent at the time of the
creation of the accounts was to provide for his spouse, it was irrelevant
whether or not the amounts of money
in the accounts were later used for
that purpose, or used for other purposes. In addition, the court noted
that the testator had told his close
friend that his mind was at ease following the various transfers as described. The court also noted that
there was evidence tending to show
that the testator had other purposes
in mind for the balance of his estate,
specifically the support of his motherin-law as well as the satisfaction of
other testamentary gifts. The court
concluded that since the widow had

been provided for by transfers made
to her during the lifetime of the decedent, she was not entitled to a share
of the decedent's estate under § 2301.
•

In the following case, the court
held that there was no evidence that
the testator had provided or intended
to provide for the surviving spouse by
transfer of property outside the will
in lieu of a testamentary provision for
the spouse and thus the spouse was
not precluded from electing to take a
share of the testator's estate as provided for by § 2-301 of the Uniform
Probate Code.
In Re Estate of Beaman (1978,
App) 119 Ariz 614, 583 P2d 270, the
court held that the children of the
deceased testator had failed to present any evidence that the testator
provided or intended to provide for
the surviving spouse by transfer of
property outside of the will, which he
had made before his marriage, so as
to preclude the surviving spouse from
taking her statutory share as provided
by §2-301 of the Uniform Probate
Code as adopted in the state of Arizona. The court noted that the evidence tended to show that the surviving spouse, before the testator's
death, had taken certain items out of
the parties' marital home, which she
alleged to have belonged to her prior
to her marriage and that, although
the testator appeared to be pleased
that he was being abandoned by his
surviving spouse, he never indicated
an intention to provide for her with
the items which she had taken out of
the home, the court also noted the
surviving spouse's testimony that, in
contradiction of what was testified to
by the testator's children, the money
which she took from the parties' joint
savings account was an amount equivalent to that amount which she had
1215
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deposited into that account at the
Estoppel or laches precluding lawtime that they were married. The ful spouse from asserting rights in
court accordingly reversed the judg- decedent's estate as against putative
ment of the trial court and remanded spouse. 81 ALR3d 110.
to the trial court in order that it
Devolution of gift over upon
might enter judgment in favor of the spouse predeceasing testator where
surviving spouse, giving to the widow gift to spouse fails because of divorce.
her statutory share of the testator's 74 ALR3d 1108.
estate, as provided for by § 2-301.
Effect of invalidity of provision conAlthough it does not discuss the ditioning testamentary gift upon diissue of what would be a transfer vorce of beneficiary, on alternative
outside of the will that would satisfy provision conditioning gift upon
the provisions of § 2-301 of the Ari- spouse's death. 74 ALR3d 1095.
zona Probate Code, inasmuch as
Surviving spouse taking elective
there was no evidence that such a share as chargeable with estate or
transfer was made, see Re Estate of inheritance tax. 67 ALR3d 199.
Beauchamp (1977, App) 115 Ariz
Inclusion of funds in savings bank
219, 564 P2d 908, in which the court trust (Totten Trust) in determining
held that the testator's second wife surviving spouse's interest in decewas an omitted spouse within the dent's estate. 64 ALR3d 187.
meaning of that statute so as to be
Acceptance of benefits under will as
entitled to one-half of the decedent's
election
precluding enforcement of
estate. The court noted that prior to
contract
right as to property behis marriage to his second wife, the
queathed.
60 ALR3d 1147.
decedent had executed a will in conExtension of time within which
formance with the provisions of a
property settlement agreement en- spouse may elect to accept or retered into between himself and his nounce will. 59 ALR3d 767.
Validity of inter vivos trust estabfirst wife, so as to provide that his
entire estate would go to the children lished by one spouse which impaired
of his first marriage following his the other spouse's distributive share
death, and that subsequent to his or other statutory rights in property.
marriage to his second wife the dece- 39 ALR3d 14.
dent failed to make any provision for
Rights of surviving spouse taking
her, or to change that prior will in under or against will as affected by
any way. However, the court noted provision in will directing conversion.
that the testator could have provided 33 ALR3d 1280.
for his wife by transfers outside of the
Waiver of right to widow's allowwill prior to his death, and that had ance by antenuptial agreement. 30
he done so he would not have been ALR3d 858.
in breach of the property setdement
•
agreement entered into between himKurtz, The Augumented Estate
self and his first wife.
Concept Under the Uniform Probate
•
Code: In Search of an Equitable ElecThe following matters are of re- tive Share. 62 Iowa L Rev 981 (1976lated interest.
1977).
Consult POCKET PART in this volume for later cases
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unfair. For a debtor's attempt to prohibit
a deficiency judgment under the Commercial Code see, Ruidoso State Bank v. Garcia,
92 N.M. 288, 587 P.2d 435 (1978). The trial
court did not err. Section 9-505(2) was not
applicable.
The trial court properly concluded that
§ 9-504 applied. Defendant did not challenge the court's conclusion that defendant
violated this section of law.
Defendant also challenged the court's
conclusion that defendant failed to act in
good faith. This conclusion was supported
by the findings of fact. Section 55-1-203
imposes an obligation of good faith upon
the parties as a duty in the performance or
enforcement of every contract. " '[G]ood
faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned." Section 55-1201(19). "'[Gfcod faith' in the case of a
merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Section
55-2-103(l)(b).
For a scholarly report on the meaning of
"good faith" see, Holmes, A Contextual
Study Of Commercial Good Faith: GoodFaith Disclosure In Contract Formation, 39
U.Pitts.L.Rev. 381 (1978). We must recognize the difficulty involved in understanding the essential elements necessary,
from an objective point of view, to constitute good faith. In viewing the evidence, a
trial judge arrives at findings of fact, based
upon personal convictions, from the type of
conduct exercised which smacks of bad
faith.
On review, being far removed from the
courtroom, our duty is to accept the findings of the trial court unless the mere review of the transcript shocks the conscience.
The trial court properly concluded that
§ 9-504 applied to defendant's sale of the
collateral and that defendant's failure to
act in good faith in the transactions violated § 1-203.
What has been decided with reference to
Begay applies equally to Reeves.
Defendant violated the terms of § 9-504.
Begay and Reeves were entitled to the sur-

EXHIBIT G

plus profit made by defendant. Defendant
emerges as a creditor whose loan plus interest were paid in full. It cannot and it did
not complain of the amount of surplus
awarded Begay and Reeves. It is a business of long and broad experience as a
pawn broker. It kept no books or records
of the sales made of the jewelry. It should
not plead that the trial court was without
authority to allow interest from November
1, 1974. This is the proximate date that
Begay and Reeves suffered their losses.
Defendant has had the benefit and use of
the money during this period of time. Its
argument was feeble and without citation
of authority. The point was adequately
discussed in Briefs-In-Chief filed on behalf
of Begay and Reeves. Not being meritorious, it deserves no response.
This appeal should be affirmed.
7w\
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In the Matter of the ESTATE of James
A. TAGGART, Deceased:
Wayne P. CUNNINGHAM, Personal Representative of the Estate of James A.
Taggart, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

Margie Ames TAGGART,
Defendant-Appellant
No. 4095.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Sept 9, 1980.
Widow appealed from judgment of District Court of Dona Ana County, Galvan, D.
J., finding that decedent was incompetent
at time of signing power of attorney, and
that decedent had provided for spouse by
transfers outside his will, intending such
transfers to be in lieu of testamentary provisions. The Court of Appeals, Andrews, J^
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held that: (1) where testimony as to competence of decedent when giving his wife
power of attorney was conflicting, and
could support either determination, jury's
answer of incompetence was affirmed, and
(2) evidence was sufficient to support jury's
determination that decedent intended
transfers to wife outside of will to be in lieu
of testamentary provision for her.
Affirmed.
1. Mental Health <s=>508
Review of question of competency of
decedent at time of making of power of
attorney considers evidence in light most
favorable to support jury's answer; the answer is not to be set aside unless not supported by evidence or inferences therefrom.
2. Evidence <s=>62
Generally, a person is presumed to be
competent and initial burden of proof of
incompetency is upon party challenging
competency.
1 Mental Health <3=>333
In action to determine competency of
decedent at time of making power of attorney, question was not whether decedent's
mind was in any way affected or impaired,
but whether decedent, at time of signing
power of attorney, was enjoying a lucid
interval.
4. Wills <s=*55(2)
General medical testimony as to competence or incompetence of a testator, general
in time sequence that does not focus on any
lucid intervals, is insufficient to show incompetence of testator, particularly when
there is conflicting testimony concerning
the specific time period in which will is
signed.
5. Mental Health <s=>508
Where testimony as to the then hospitalized decedent's competence when he gave
his second wife of two years a power of
attorney was conflicting, and the evidence
supported either a determination of competence or incompetence, the jury's answer of
incompetency at time of making the power
of attorney would be affirmed, particularly

in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals must review the evidence in light
most favorable to the jury's answer,
"* Gifts <3=»30(4)
Trusts <3»34(1)
Generally it is held to be not sufficient
to show simply the opening of a joint
account in the name of one person "and"
another, "or" another, without more, in order to establish a gift, or trust.
7. Gifts e=>30(4)
Question of deep concern of husband as
to how easily and how quickly his surviving
wife could have for her use money in bank
in case of him predeceasing her is not important on question of whether there was a
transfer from husband to wife at time of
opening of joint account; it is intention of
owner of funds at time of making deposits
that controls.
8. Gifts c=>49(5)
Evidence that transfers of money to
joint accounts in name of husband and wife
were made shortly after marriage, and that
husband said he wanted wife to be protected, was sufficient to support jury's finding
that husband intended to provide for wife
by transfers outside of his will, regardless
whether funds from those accounts were
later used by wife to pay day-to-day expenses.
9. Wills s=>782(ll)
Evidence was sufficient to support
jury's determination that it was intent of
decedent to provide for wife of two years
by transfers of funds to joint checking and
savings accounts and by transfer of retirement account to wife, and that these transfers outside of will, executed before his
marriage, were to be in lieu of testamentary provision.

Lloyd 0. Bates, Jn, Las Cruces, for defendant-appellant.
James T. Martin, Jr., Las Cruces, for
plaintiff-appellee.
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OPINION

ANDREWS, Judge.
Two questions are presented in this appeal from a district court probate proceeding. The first seeks a determination of the
evidence required to support the jury's determination of incompetency at the time of
making the power of attorney; and the
second, relates to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury's determination that the decedent had made transfers
outside of his will in lieu of providing for
his surviving spouse in his will.
James A. Taggart, a widower, executed a
will on March 23, 1976, which provided tftat
his entire estate be placed in trust for the
benefit of his deceased wife's mother, Margaret L. Taggart, 1 and in the event of fter
predeceasing the testator, the property v^as
left in three equal parts to Barbara Shannon, Wilma P. Swingle and Wayne P. Cunningham.2
Subsequent to the execution of the will,
Sagg,ar4i TnaxraA Y\te feifcitftaiA,, ^tergS^
Ames Taggart (Margie). Taggart died on
May 30, 1978. After the probate proceedings had been filed, Margie claimed she \^as
an omitted spouse pursuant to § 45^2301(A), N.M.S.A. (1978 Comp.). The personal representative (Cunningham) then
filed a complaint against Margie alleging
that the decedent, after having made his
Last Will and Testament and after having
married Margie, had provided for her by
transfers outside of the will, and, in particular by designating her as a joint-tenant on
a checking account,3 designating her a$ a
joint-tenant on a savings account,4 and by
making an election under his retirement
plan from the Bureau of Reclamation to
enable Margie to receive life-long retirement benefits in the amount of $410 per
month. Cunningham also asserted that because T a ^ a r t was not mentally competent

prior to his death, a power of attorney he
executed six days before he died was void
and deeds executed by Margie under the
power of attorney were also void.5
After trial, the jury answered interroga*
tories to the effect that Taggart was not
mentally competent on May 24, 1978, when
he signed the power of attorney; that he
did not intend for the power of attorney to
be used to transfer his real property into
joint tenancy; and that he had provided for
his spouse by transfers outside his will and
intended for such transfers to be in lieu of
testamentary provisions for Margie.
In her appeal, the widow asserts that
there is not substantial evidence to support
the jury's answer that Taggart was incompetent when he signed the power of attorney; and, there is insufficient evidence as a
matter of law to support the jury's answer
that Taggart had made transfers outside
his will in lieu of providing for his surviving
spouse in his will.

f

1. A second cousin by marnage to decedent,
consequently the last names are the same.
2. The three are fnends or distant relatives of
the deceased.
3. Account No. 05-35530-0 which had a balance
of $2,889 87 at the time of decedent's death.

The Power of Attorney
[1] On May 24, 1978, Taggart, who was
confined to the hospital by an illness which
resulted in his death on May 30, 1978, executed a power of attorney to Margie Ames
Taggart. Whether Taggart was incompetent when he signed the power of attorney
is the question before us here. The jury's
answer to an interrogatory has the posture,
on appeal, of a finding of fact made by the
trial court in a non-jury trial. The issue is
whether the jury's answer is supported by
evidence. Our review considers the evidence in the light most favorable to support
the jury's answer; the answer is not to be
set aside unless the answer is not supported
by the evidence or inferences therefrom.
Lovato v. Hicks, 74 N.M. 733, 398 P.2d 59
(1965V
4. Account No 33-000-931-6, Mutual Savings
& Loan Assn with a balance of $15,908 at the
time of decedent's death.
5. Some other matters were alleged in the complaint but are not the subject of this appeal.
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[2,3] Generally, a person is presumed to
be competent and the initial burden of
proof of incompetency is upon the party
challenging competency. McElhinney v.
Kelly, 67 N.M. 399, 356 P.2d 113 (1960); In
the Matter of the Estate of William Grady
Head, N.M.App., 615 P.2d 271, 1980. The
question is not whether the mind of Mr.
Taggart wras in any way affected or impaired, but whether he, at the time of signing the power of attorney, was enjoying a
lucid interval. In the Matter of the Estate
of William Grady Head, supra.
The action of the unimpaired faculties of
the mind will supply a lucid interval. Although the mental power may be reduced
below the ordinary standard, yet, if there
be sufficient intelligence to understand
and appreciate the act, the mental ability
to execute the instrument remains and
the execution thereof is valid. It is
enough if the mental faculties retained
sufficient strength to comprehend the act
to be done. In the Matter of William
Grady Head, supra, Vol. 19, St.B.Bull.
page 764.
If a person's mind is affected or impaired,
the question is whether he, at the time of
execution of the instrument was enjoying a
lucid interval. In the Matter of the Estate
of William Grady Head, supra.
The evidence shows that in January, 1978,
James Taggart was confined to the hospital
because of pneumonia. At a later date he
suffered a heart attack and was returned to
the hospital by ambulance. Ted Wood, the
head nurse in charge of the intensive care
unit where Taggart was admitted testified
that during the period in question Taggart
was suffering from renal failure, cardiac
failure with pulmonary edema, pleural effusion, respiratory failure with emphysema,
bronchitis and asthma in addition to having
diabetes mellitus and cerebral arteriosclerosis with chronic brain syndrome. In reviewing his nurse's notes, the same witness
testified that Taggart was receiving Meprobamate, a sleeping medication, Keflex, an
antibiotic, Lasix, a diuretic, Thorazine for
agitation, Librium for sedation and Valium
for agitation.
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The power of attorney was executed
some time during the late morning or early
afternoon hours of May 24, 1978. According to Wood, that morning Taggart was
referring to people in his past as if they
were present and in the afternoon hours he
was disoriented.
The floor nurse, Margaret Alvarez, testified that Taggart's general state was one of
drifting in and out of confusion and disorientation. She testified that on the shift
ending at 7:00 A.M. on May 23rd, Taggart
did not know where he was; he hit his face
with a water glass when attempting to
drink; and that he had slept only thirty
minutes before 11:30 P.M. of May 22nd, and
6:30 A.M. of May 23rd. In her opinion,
since Taggart "could not stay lucid for
more than an hour" it was unlikely that
Taggart knew what he was doing during
the shift ending at 7:00 A.M. on May 23rd.
Against this general background, Margie
Ames Taggart, went to the decedent's room
and procured Taggart's signature on a power of attorney. Charles Busby, Taggart's
roommate, testified that Margie Ames Taggart came to the room around twelve
o'clock and that Taggart refused to sign the
document. Margie came back later; Taggart then signed the power of attorney.
The following exchange was had between
counsel and witness Busby:
BY MR HUBERT:
Q. Did you hear Mr. Taggart say anything:
*
*
*
*
*
*
BY MR. BUSBY:
A. I heard him say he didn't want to
sign it.
Q. Did Mrs. Taggart say anything to
him?
A. At that time?
Q. Yes.
A. She convinced him to sign the paper
by kissing him, teasing him, that
kind of thing.
Q. You had been with Mr. Taggart for
approximately a day before this
time?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Could you describe to the jury what
his general condition was in layman's
terms?
A. I can't say what-when he was confused and when he wasn't confused
because I am not aware of his normal state. I never seen him not once
that I thought that he was competent. I thought he was confused the
whole time. Again, I say I don't
know what his normal state of mind
was.
Q. Did Mrs. Taggart, during this conversation tell Mr. Taggart why she
wanted the legal document executed?
A. Yes, she needed to get some money
to pay some bills and living expenses.
*
*
*
*
*
*
A. I believe he was confused the whole
time, yes, sir. More at sometimes,
less at sometimes, but I do not think
he was normal at any time.
Cunningham also visited the hospital
room that day between 4:00 P.M. and 5:30
P.M., and observed that Taggart "was not
competent at all." He observed the exchange between Taggart and Margie, the
substance of which was "get off my back,
Margie, all you want was [sic] my blankety-blank money." Cunningham, a long
time close personal friend of Taggart, testified that'Taggart "didn't know who I was,"
that Taggart was "pantomining" like he
was smoking in bed and like he was drinking with both hands, that Taggart was
"talking about marching men or ships in
World War II", and also talking about construction work, "to bring his gloves, to
bring a wheel barrow, to keep the line taut,
things of this nature." Cunningham also
testified that Taggart, in his opinion, would
not have understood that he was signing a
power of attorney; that May 24th "wasn't
any different than any other of the days
that I visited with him. You know, he
was-he was just kind of out of it."
However, even though Nurse Alvarez,
who had no personal knowledge as to Taggart's condition on the 24th, testified that
Taggart was confused on occasion, and "un-

able to stay lucid," she responded in the
positive when asked if there were occasions
when Taggart was "totally lucid and knew
what he was doing." Wood, in testifying
from the floor notes indicated "on 5-24,
7:00 to 9:00 A.M., awake, very much more
alert today." Wood's testimony indicated
that approximately seven hours later, the
notes show that Taggart "appeared disoriented," but he never testified as to personal
knowledge and observation of Taggart, and
had no opinion as to Taggart's competency.
Although Busby believed Mr. Taggart was
confused, Margie said he was not confused
at the time he executed the document even
though Cunningham saw Taggart at 4:00
P.M. and thought he was confused then.
The social worker and notary public employed by the hospital who notarized the
power of attorney testified as to facts that
occurred at the time of the signing, including talking to Taggart, questioning him,
asking him if he knew and understood what
he was doing, if he was willing to sign the
document, asking him if he knew what it
was for and various other questions. She
indicated that in her opinion he knew and
understood what he was doing. However
she also testified that no other patient was
in the room at the time of the signing, see
Busby testimony, and that Taggart was in
intensive care when the power of attorney
was signed. Other evidence is that Taggart
had been moved out of intensive care prior
to signing the power of attorney. A second
hospital social worker who had seen Taggart on many occasions thought he understood what she was talking about with him.
[4] In the Matter of the Estate of William Grady Head, the court dealt with general medical testimony concerning whether
or not the testator could have had a lucid
interval at the time he signed an amendment. Judge Sutin noted, "for Dr. Seelinger's testimony to be effective, he would
have had to testify that Mr. Head could not
have had a lucid interval at the time he
signed the first amendment" Three things
may be seen from the Head decision. The
first is that the presumption is that Mr,
Taggart was competent. The second is that
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even a lunatic may make a will for sale of
property in a lucid interval, and if a person's mind is affected or impaired, the question is whether he, at the time of the execution of the instrument, was enjoying a lucid
interval. Finally, general medical testimony as to the competence or incompetence of
a testator, general in time sequence that
does not focus on any lucid intervals, is
insufficient to show incompetence-particuIarly when there is conflicting testimony
concerning the specific time period in which
the will is signed.
However, the instant case differs from
the Matter of the Estate of William Grady
Head in that we are not confronted with an
instance where the testimony in conflict is
general medical testimony versus a specific
statement from the time signature was
made. Rather, we have two conflicting
statements from the exact moment of signature. In addition, we have statements
concerning the lucidity of Mr. Taggart from
the immediate time surrounding the signature.
As noted above, Busby testified that Taggart at first refused to sign the paper but
was convinced by Mrs. Taggart's "kissing
him, teasing him, and that kind of thing."
In seeming contradiction is the testimony of
the social worker and notary public who
testified that at the time of the signing she
talked to Taggart, questioned him, and
asked if he knew and understood what he
was doing. It is clear that we are faced
with a simple factual question which
presents sufficient evidence to have allowed
the jury to have decided either way. Certainly the statements of the social worker
and the notary public, particularly when
viewed in conjunction with Wood's testimony from the floor notes of May 24 stating
that Taggart was very much more alert
that day, could have allowed the jury to
make a determination on the degree of impairment of Taggart's mind and the question of whether he, at the time of the
execution of the instrument, was enjoying a
lucid interval.
However, the evidence supports an alternative interpretation. Taggart's reluctance

to sign the document, and Margie's influence upon him is testified to by Busby and
is as reliable as the statements of the social
worker and the notary public, having occurred at approximately the same time. In
addition, there were the statements of the
use of medication, the inability of Taggart
to distinguish between people from the past
and present, and the fact that he was disoriented that afternoon. We, therefore, are
not dealing with a general statement of
medical opinion as was the case In the
Matter of the Estate of William Grady
Head, id.; rather, it is conflicting testimony
and the inferences therefrom wrhich would
have supported the jury's decision.
[5] Therefore, since we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's answer, and since the question is one
for the factfinder and there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to make its determination, the jury's answer of incompetency
at the time of making the power of attorney is affirmed.
The second issue arises under § 45-2301(A), N.M.S.A. (1978 Comp.), and involves
the question of whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict
that James A. Taggart provided for his
spouse by transfers outside of his will and
that he intended such transfers to be in lieu
of a testamentary provision for her. Section 45-2-301(A) states:
If a testator fails to provide by will for
the surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will, the
omitted spouse shall receive the same
share of the estate he would have received if the decedent left no will unless
it appears from the will that the omission
wras intentional, or the testator provided
for the spouse by transfer outside the will
and the intent that the transfer be in lieu
of the testamentary provision is shown by
statements of the testator or from the
amount of the transfer or other evidence.
The instant question of what constitutes
substantial evidence of intent to transfer in
lieu of testamentary provision appears to be
an issue of first impression in New Mexico.
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The Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual provides some illumination on the intended effect of this section.
Hence, the Code permits, within certain
limits evidence to establish whether the
testator would have wanted a share for
the spouse or child. In the case of a
spouse married after the execution of the
will, it must appear from the will that the
omission was intentional or that the testator may have provided for the spouse
by transfer outside the will, such as life
insurance or joint tenancy arrangements.
In such cases the intent of the testator
that these transfers be in lieu of a testamentary provision may be shown by evidence of the testator's statements or the
amount of the transfer, or other evidence.
Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual,
Vol. I, ed. Richard V. Wellman, Second Edition, 1977, p. 115.
The question is, therefore, whether such
indicia as the testator's statements, the
amount of transfer, and other relevant evidence were present in the instant case.
At trial, it was asserted that Mr. Taggart
had made provisions for his wife sufficient
to demonstrate the intent that these transfers were in lieu of any testamentary provision. Three such transfers were discussed.
The first, was creation of a joint tenancy in
checking account containing approximately
$2,900. The second, was the creation of a
joint tenancy in a savings account containing approximately $15,900. Finally, there
was the assignments of benefits in a retirement plan which provides Margie Taggart
with approximately $400 per month. In
addition to the actual transfers, plaintiff
sought to show that certain statements of
the parties and the circumstances surrounding the use of the funds in these accounts
demonstrated transfers intended to be in
lieu of a testamentary provision.
Thus, two points must be discussed to
determine whether the transfers made by
James Taggart fall within the provision of
§ 45-2-301(A). The first point is whether
the creation of the joint tenancy in the
bank accounts amounts to a transfer within
the meaning of the statute. The second is

whether the statements of Mr. Taggart
made either in contemplation of the marriage or afterward, or the amount of the
transfers, provide sufficient proof of the
intent of Taggart to satisfy the plaintiffs
burden of proving an exception to the omitted spouse statute.
1. A transfer under § 45-2-301(A).
[6,7] The statute required that, "the
testator provided for the spouse by transfer
outside the will." Defendant-appellant asserted that the funds from the joint account
were used for paying the decedent's exmother-in-law's house bills and cost of living* expenses for Mr. Taggart and his wife.
Also, the savings account was being used to
pay for the anticipated cost of a rest home.
This, it is argued, undercuts the assertion
that these funds had been transferred at
all. Rather, defendant-appellant asserts
these funds had not been truly transferred
to Margie Taggart, but had merely been
placed in an account convenient for the
paying of general bills.
We know that generally it is held to be
not sufficient to show simply the opening
of a joint account in the name of one
person "and" another, "or" another, without more, in order to establish a gift, or a
trust. Jones v. Fullbright, et a/., 197 N.C.
274, 148 S E. 229.
Also,
The testimony going to the husband's
deep concern as to how easily and quickly
his surviving wife could have for her use
the money in the bank in case of him
predeceasing her, amply supports the theory that the husband quite properly may
have given consideration to the provisions
of the will when he opened the joint
account or, he may have forgotten or may
not have been concerned about such will.
That question is not important. It is the
intention of the owner of the funds at the
time of making the deposit that controls.
Menger v. Otero County State Bank, 44
N.M. 82, 98 P.2d 834 (1940).
As in Menger, the question becomes simply one of whether there was evidence to
support the jury's answer. If Margie was
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merely given access to those funds to provide a convenient method for managing the
couple's expenses, it was not a transfer to
her. However, if the intention of the owner of the funds at the time of making the
deposit was that those funds should become
hers, for her use, it was a proper transfer.
[8] In this case, the transfers were
made shortly after the marriage. Also,
Margie testified that "he (Mr. Taggart) just
said he wanted me to be protected . . . " If
such was the case, it is not material whether funds from those accounts were later
used to pay day-to-day expenses. It was
the intent of Mr. Taggart at the time of
making the transfer which controls. Meager, id. The foregoing is substantial evidence that Mr. Taggart intended to provide
for Mrs. Taggart, thereby permitting the
jury to answer that this was a transfer.
2. Intent that the transfers be in lieu of
the testamentary provision.
Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Taggart intended to transfer the funds in the
checking, savings, and retirement accounts
to Margie Taggart, the plaintiffs also had
the burden of demonstrating that Mr. Taggart considered the fact that she was not a
beneficiary under the will and had intended
the transfers to take the place of such testamentary devise. As noted above, several
factors may be considered in making this
determination including the period of time
which the couple had been married, the
amount transferred to Mrs. Taggart and
the portion of the total estate to others. As
to the first of these factors, the couple had
been married for less than two years. This
is not dispositive, but does reflect on intent
As to the portion transferred to Margie as a
percentage of the entire estate, plaintiff
correctly points out that the record is void
of any reference to the total value of the
decedent's estate. Richardson Ford Sales v.
Cummins, 74 N.M. 271, 393 P.2d 11 (1964).
However, accepting defendant's figures
that the transfers represented twenty percent of the total estate, this amount when
added to the $410 monthly retirement benefits would provide Margie with a not insignificant amount.

[9] The trial court had before it statements from a variety of people concerning
both Mr. Taggart's intent in making the
original transfers and his intentions that
the balance of the estate be used for other
purposes. Margie herself testified that
shortly after the marriage both the election
of benefits and the retirement plan and
other financial considerations were made to
"protect" her. Also, Taggart's close friend,
Wayne Cunningham testified that Taggart
said "everything was settled and all taken
care of and that he felt good that everything was taken care of, and he had no
more worries." Finally, there were statements that the balance of the estate was to
be used for, among other things, the maintenance of Margie Taggart, his former
mother-in law. Mrs. Taggart, 92 years
old, testified that Taggart had paid her
utility bills and had helped her financially
in other ways for twenty-two years. A
friend of Taggart's, Dorothy Smith, testified that Taggart had always taken care of
the mother-in-law, and that Taggart had
stated "that he would always see to it that
Maggie was well-cared for."
The trial court stated:
The testimony is conflicting, even from
the deposition and live witnesses, but the
testimony that Mr. Taggart intended to
take care of Mrs. Margaret L. Taggart
. . . for her lifetime, and that is what the
will provided may be evidenced, in addition to other testimony of witnesses, that
the transfers made were intended in lieu
of testamentary disposition to the wife.
It is for the jury to determine. They will
make that factual determination.
We believe that the trial court correctly
stated the law. The jury's determination
that it was the intent of Mr. Taggart to
provide for Margie by transfers outside of
the will was supported by substantial evidence. There was evidence which showed
his intent to provide her with funds by the
creation of joint accounts and a retirement
plan. There was evidence to show that he
had considered the terms of his will and the
fact that Margie Taggart was not included
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in the will. Finally, there was evidence to
show that it was his intent, even after he
was married, that a portion of the estate be
used for other purposes.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
WOOD, C. J., and LOPEZ, J., concur.
fSwX
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95 N.M. 125
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Alex HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant
No. 4596.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Sept 30, 1980.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Eddy County, Fort, D. J., of
battery upon a police officer, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, J., held
that: (1) where police officer was conducting an investigation of reported disturbance
in routine manner and in lawful discharge
of his duties, detention of defendant was
not illegal, and (2) where defendant had
driven car several feet in arresting officer's
presence before his arrest, and officer had
smelled alcohol and noted defendant's
slurred speech, there was no lack of probable cause to arrest defendant
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <&=»1083
When the Court of Appeals denied defendant permission to appeal from interlocutory order, the Court of Appeals did not
assume jurisdiction of matter, and thus jurisdiction remained in trial court and there

v\as nothing to prevent trial court from
proceeding to trj pending case, e\en though
defendant's trial commenced one day before
issuance of mandate denying his interlocutory appeal. Rules of Criminal Appellate
Procedure, Rule 203; NMSA 1978, §§ 393-3, subd. A(3), 39-3-4,39-3-4, subd. C.
2. Criminal Law c=> 1129(3)
Where defendant, who was convicted
of battery upon a police officer, failed to
include issue whether he was entitled to
instruction on lesser included offense of
simple battery in docketing statement, issue
was not before the Court of Appeals for
review. Rules of Criminal Appellate Procedure, Rule 501(a)(2).
3. Arrest c=>63.1
Where police officer was conducting an
investigation of reported disturbance in
routine manner and in lawful discharge of
his duties, detention of defendant was not
illegal. U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 4.
4. Automobiles c=>349
Where defendant, who was convicted
of battery upon a police officer, had driven
car several feet in arresting officer's presence before he was arrested, and officer
had smelled alcohol and noted defendant's
slurred speech, there was no lack of probable cause to arrest U.S.C.A.Const Amend.
4.
Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Michael EL
Sanchez, Asst Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Thomas B. Root, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant
OPINION
WALTERS, Judge.
The defendant was convicted of battery
upon a police officer. On appeal, his appellate counsel (who did not represent Hernandez at trial and did not prepare the docketing statement see N.M.R.CrimA.pp.P.
205(b), N.M.SA.1978) argues four points for
reversal. Each is considered below, and
rejected.
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Jerry
M. KNUDSEN, deceased, Burleigh
County Probate No. 3107 Appeals from
Order entered January 26, 1981.
Dann G. KNUDSEN and Eric J. Knudsen,
as personal representatives of the estate
of Jerry M. Knudsen, deceased; and
Dann G. Knudsen, Eric J. Knudsen and
Jeffrey Knudsen, Appellees,
v.
Susan F. KNUDSEN, one of the heirs at
law of Jerry M. Knudsen,
deceased, Appellant
Civ. No. 10427.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Jan. 4, 1984
Wife of the deceased was decreed by
the probate court to be an omitted spouse
entitled to an intestate share and, on appeal
to the District Court of Burleigh County,
South Central Judicial District, Eugene A.
Burdick, Surrogate Judge, a trial de novo
to a jury resulted in a special verdict that
transfers of property to the wife outside
the will were intended by the deceased to
be in lieu of a testamentary provision for
her. After remand, 322 N.W.2d 454, the
Supreme Court, Pederson, J., held that life
insurance benefits and joint tenancy properties provided by deceased for his wife
Were "transfers" within statute governing
8hare of an omitted spouse and, hence,
Were properly made a basis for conclusion
«at wife was not entitled to receive same
share of estate she would have received if
deceased left no will because deceased intended to provide for wife outside of his
^ffl when he named her beneficiary on his
™e insurance policies and joint tenant on
several items of property.
Affirmed.
*• Courts <£=»30
As a general rule where there has
"^n a statutory change of jurisdiction, the

court which has validly acquired jurisdiction in a specific case before the enactment
generally does not lose that jurisdiction on
the effective date of the statute unless loss
of jurisdiction is clearly expressed.
2. Courts <s=>30
Assuming that the district court by
statutory enactment lost jurisdiction over
an appeal taken from the county probate
court after January 1, 1983, where the appeal in the particular case was taken prior
to that date, the district court was not
without subject-matter jurisdiction in the
particular case and its judgment, though
entered in a trial de novo after that date,
was not void since the newly enacted statute did not mention a case pending on
appeal to district court and thus it was to
be presumed that there was no legislative
intent to strip the district court of its jurisdiction of an appeal perfected before the
date in question. NDCC 27-05-06, subd. 4,
30.1-02-02, subd. 2; NDCC 30-26-01 et
seq. (Repealed).
3. Statutes <©=>223.1
Where there is doubt as to the meaning of a word in a statute, courts may
properly refer to cognate or related legislation to determine the sense in which the
word was employed in the statute.
4. Statutes <s=205, 208
The meaning of a word in a given
sentence or clause of a statute may be
affected not only by the context, but also
by the subject to which it is applied.
5. Wills <3=>535
The word "transfers," within statute
requiring that an omitted spouse receive
the same share of the estate she would
have received if the deceased left no will
unless it appears from the will that the
omission was intentional or the deceased
provided for the spouse by transfers outside the will, was meant to include life
insurance payable to a spouse and joint
tenancy property with a right of survivor-
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ship. NDCC 30.1-06-01, 30.1-06-01, subd.
1.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
6. Wills <3=>535
Life insurance benefits and joint tenancy properties provided by deceased for his
wife were "transfers" within statute governing share of an omitted spouse and,
hence, were properly made a basis for conclusion that wife was not entitled to receive
same share of estate she would have received if deceased left no will because deceased intended to provide for wife outside
of his will when he named her beneficiary
on his life insurance policies and joint tenant on several items of property. NDCC
30.1-06-01, 30.1-06-01, subd. 1.
7. Wills <3=>535
A trier of fact may determine from the
amount of the transfers alone whether or
not the deceased intended that the transfers to a spouse outside of the will be in
lieu of a testamentary provision. NDCC
30.1-05-01, 30.1-06-01, subd. 1.
8. Appeal and Error <s=*989, 994(2)
On appeal from a judgment entered
upon a verdict, the Supreme Court will not
invade the province of the jury to weigh
evidence or to determine the credibility of
witnesses.
9. Appeal and Error e=>930(l), 1001(1)
In reviewing the evidence on appeal
from a judgment entered upon a verdict,
the Supreme Court will view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict
and, if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, will not set that verdict
aside.
10. Wills <s=»704
Whether deceased's wife received, as a
beneficiary of several life insurance policies
and as a survivor in several joint tenancy
properties, a total of more than $437,000
was a question of fact for jury in determining amount of transfers made by deceased
to his wife in lieu of testamentary provi-

sions.
NDCC
subd. 1.

30.1-05-01,

30.1-06-01,

11. Trial <3>213, 266
A trial court need not give instructions
in the specific language requested by a
litigant; instructions which fairly inform
the jury of the applicable law are all that is
required.
12. Appeal and Error <s=1026
No error in either the admission or
exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or anything done or
omitted by the trial court or by any of the
parties is a ground for setting aside a
verdict unless refusal to take such action
appears to the Supreme Court to be inconsistent with substantial justice.

E.J. Rose, Bismarck, for appellees; argued by E J. Rose.
Mills & Moore, Bismarck, for appellant;
argued by William R Mills, Bismarck.
PEDERSON, Justice.
Susan F. Knudsen was decreed by the
probate court to be an omitted spouse entitled to an intestate share in the estate of
her late husband,
!.!. Knudsen. On
appeal to the district court, a trial de novo
to a jury resulted in a special verdict that
transfers of property to Susan outside the
will were intended by Jerry to be in lieu of
a testamentary provision for her. Susan
appealed from the judgment entered upon
the verdict We affirm.
In 1962, Jerry executed his only will devising his entire estate to his wife at the
time, Lela Margaret Knudsen. The will
provided that in the event Lela predeceased
Jerry, or if they died simultaneously, the
entire estate would pass to Jerry and Lela's
sons, Jeffrey, Dann, and Eric. In 1975,
Jerry divorced Lela and married Susan but
never changed or supplemented his 1962
will. In 1979, while married to Susan, Jerry died in a hunting-boating accident
Susan was the named beneficiary in several life insurance policies and she was'a
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joint owner with*Jerry of several items of
property.
This is the second time that the question,
whether or not Jerry intended to provide
for Susan outside of his will when he
named her beneficiary on his life insurance
policies and joint tenant on several items of
property, has been before this court We
held previously that a mere showing that
the amount of the benefits provided Susan
ouHde of the will exceeded one-third of the
augmented estate, did not warrant a conclusion, as a matter of law, that Jerry
intended those benefits to be in lieu of any
testamentary provision for Susan. We reminded-the case to the district court for
trial de novo with a jury. See Matter of
Estate ofKnudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454 (N.D.
1982).
At the conclusion of the trial after remand, the jury answered affirmatively the
following Special Verdict question: "Did
Jerry intend one or more of the transfers
of property made to Susan outside the Will
to be in lieu of making any testamentary
provision for her?"
JURISDICTION
Before reaching the merits, we first consider Susan's claim that the judgment entered by the district court is void because
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
At the time these proceedings were commenced, district courts clearly had jurisdiction over appeals from probate courts pursuant to §§ 27-05-06(4) and 30.1-02-02(2),
NDCC, and Chapter 30-26, NDCC. Chapter 30-26 was repealed and §§ 27-05-06(4)
and 30.1-02-02(2) were amended effective
January 1, 1983. See § 51, Ch. 319, S.L.
1981; § 51, Ch. 320, S.L.1981; § 64, Ch. 82,
S.L.1983; § 2, Ch. 352, S.L.1983. Although
* may be otherwise argued, we will presume for the purposes of this case that
district courts generally, on January 1,
1983, lost jurisdiction over appeals taken
after that date from county probate courts.
*• Accord Berg v. Traeger, 210 Cal. 323, 325-326,
292 P. 495, 496 (1930); Willen v. Boggs, 21
CaUppJd 520, 522 n. 1, 97 Cal.Rptr. 917, 918 n.

When this case was here before, we noted that under the constitution, appellate
jurisdiction of the district court may be
provided by law or by rule of the Supreme
Court If direct appeals from probate
courts to this court create the nightmare
that has been predicted, this court has the
power, apparently, to restore all probate
appeals to the district court See Matter of
Estate of Knudsen, supra, 322 N.W.2d at
456.
The appeal to the district court in this
case was taken in 1981. The trial was not
held and the judgment was not entered by
the district court until February 1983. Susan argues that after January 1, 1983, the
district court had no power other than to
remand the case to the Burleigh County
Court We do not agree.
In Staehling v. Schneider, 545 S.W.2d
273, 274 (Tex.Civ.App.1976), a case which is
in many respects similar to this case, the
court stated:
"Generally, where a right of action or
a remedy is derived from a statute which
is subsequently repealed, and the repealing statute contains no savings clause in
favor of pending suits, the right of action
or remedy is lost unless relief has been
granted before the effective date of the
repeal
"Where, however, the right of appeal
has become perfected upon performance
of the specified statutory requirements,
the court of review retains jurisdiction
over the appeal unless the repealing statute indicates a contrary legislative intent"
[1,2] It can be stated as a general rule
that where there has been a statutory
change of jurisdiction, the court which had
validly acquired jurisdiction in a specific
case before the enactment, generally does
not lose that jurisdiction on the effective
date of the statute unless loss of jurisdiction is clearly expressed. See 20 Am.
Jur.2d Courts § 150 (1965); 21 CJ.S.
Courts § 92 (1940).1 Because the legisla1 (1971); Atkins v. Rayburn, 506 S.W^d 208,
209 (Tex. 1974); Cluck v. Ballenger, 543 S.W.2d
159, 161 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976).
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ture did not mention cases pending on appeal to the district courts, it is deemed that
there was no legislative intent to strip the
district courts of jurisdiction of probate
court appeals which had been perfected
before January 1, 1983.
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to try the instant case and to enter
judgment thereon.
MERITS
Susan argues that the trial court erred in
its jury instruction regarding "transfers"
under § 30.1-06-01(1)(2-301), NDCC, which
provides:
"30.1-06-01(2-301). Omitted spouse —
1. If a testator fails to provide by will
for his surviving spouse who married the
testator after the execution of the will,
the omitted spouse shall receive the same
share of the estate he would have received if the decedent left no will unless
it appears from the will that the omission
was intentional or the testator provided
for the spouse by transfer outside the
will and the intent that the transfer be in
lieu of a testamentary provision is shown
by statements of the testator or from the
amount of the transfer or other evidence."
The trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
"(5) That Jerry made a number of
transfers outside his Will to Susan. As
beneficiary named by Jerry in several
life insurance policies, she received the
proceeds of the policies payable on his
death. As surviving joint owner, she
became on his death sole owner of several joint bank accounts. As surviving
joint-tenant, she became on his death sole
owner of other properties held by Jerry
and her in joint-tenancy."
Susan argues that the trial court erred
because life insurance benefits and joint
tenancy properties are not "transfers"
within the purview of § 30.1-06-01(2-301),
NDCC.
[3,4] The word "transfer" is not
defined in Title 30.1, NDCC. Where there

is doubt as to the meaning of a word in a
statute, courts may properly "refer to cognate or related legislation to determine the
sense in which the word was employed" in
the statute. Syllabus by the court in Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 215, 229 N.W.
282, 283 (1930). See also Thielen v. Kostelecky, 69 N.D. 410, 416, 287 N.W. 513, 516
(1939) ["The meaning of a word in a given
sentence or clause may be affected not
only by the context, but also by the subject
to which it is applied."]
Although the Editorial Board Comment
to § 30.1-06-01(2-301), NDCC, makes no
mention of life insurance benefits and joint
tenancy properties as constituting "transfers" for purposes of the statute, the Comment states that "[t]he effect of this section should be to reduce the number of
instances where a spouse will claim an
elective share." As pointed out by Justice
Sand in his specially concurring opinion in
Matter of Estate of Knudsen, supra, under § 30.1-05-02(2-202), NDCC, the augmented estate statute, the Editorial Board
Comment states that "life insurance proceeds payable to the surviving spouse are
included in the second category [of transfers to other persons], because it seems
unfair to allow a surviving spouse to disturb the decedents estate plan if the
spouse has received ample provision from
life insurance." The Editorial Board Comment to the pretermitted children statute,
§ 30.1-06-02(2-302), NDCC, which contains
language similar to that used in the omitted spouse section, also speaks of "nonprobate transfers such as life insurance or
joint accounts
"
We are also directed by § 30.1-0102(1)(1-102), NDCC, to construe Title 30.1
"to promote its underlying purposes and
policies." One of the purposes and policies
of Title 30.1 is "[t]o make uniform the law
among the various jurisdictions." § 30.101-02(2)(e)(l-102), NDCC. The Uniform
Probate Code Practice Manual provides
some illumination on the intended effect of
the omitted spouse statute:
"The provisions of Part 3 of Article II
are intended to protect the spouse and
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children in the enumerated situations
only if the omission was unintentional.
Hence, the Code permits, within certain
limits, evidence to establish whether the
testator would have wanted a share for
the spouse or child. In the case of a
spouse married after the execution of the
will, it must appear from the will that the
omission was intentional or that the testator may have provided for the spouse
by transfer outside the will, such as life
insurance or joint tenancy arrangements. In such cases the intent of the
testator that these transfers be in lieu of
a testamentary provision may be shown
by evidence of the testator's statements
or the amount of the transfer, or other
evidence—" [Emphasis added.] 1
Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual
115 (2d ed. 1977).
We also note that courts in Arizona and
New Mexico, jurisdictions which have also
adopted the Uniform Probate Code, have
recognized that life insurance payable to a
spouse and joint tenancy property with a
right of survivorship can be included as
"transfers" within the meaning of the omitted spouse section. See Matter of Estate
of Beaman, 119 Ariz. 614, 617-618, 583
PJ2d 270, 273-274 (CtApp.1978); Matter of
Estate of Taggart, 95 N.M. 117, 123-124,
619 P.2d 562, 568-569 (CtApp.1980). See
also Annot, 11 A.L.R. 4th 1213 (1982).
[5,6] We conclude that life insurance
benefits and joint tenancy arrangements
constitute "transfers" for the purposes of
the omitted spouse statute.2 It is evident

that through its adoption of the Uniform
Probate Code, the legislature did not intend
the literal definition of "transfer" found in
§ 47-09-01, NDCC, to apply to Title 30.1.
Nor do §§ 47-10-23.1 and 47-11-16,
NDCC, affect our conclusion. It appears
these statutes were enacted "for purposes
of chapter 57-37.1" which relates to estate
taxes. See § 3, CK 483, S.L.1979. We
note that "the objectives of a tax law are
different from those involved . . . in the
Probate Code...." §30.1-05-02(2-202),
NDCC, Editorial Board Comment The trial court's instruction was not erroneous.
Susan also contends that the district
court erred in instructing the jury that the
amount of the transfers alone could be the
basis for determining if Jerry intended the
transfers to be in lieu of a testamentary
provision. After essentially tracking the
statutory language of § 30.1-06-01(1)(2301), NDCC, the district court instructed
the jury as follows:
"In this case, there is nothing in Jerry's will that indicates that the omission
of Susan was intentional. The Petitioners contend rather that Susan does not
qualify for an intestate share under the
foregoing provision of the law for the
reason that Jerry provided for her by
transfers of property outside the will and
that his intent that the transfers be in
lieu of a testamentary provision is
shown, not by statements of Jerry, but
from the amount of the transfers or other evidence. This contention of the Petitioners is refuted by Susan, thus present-

2. The court in Taggart, supra, appears to have
taken the position that whether or not a "transfer" itself has occurred within the context of the
omitted spouse section, at least with regard to
joint tenancy properties, is a question properly
left to the jury and distinct from the question
whether or not the "transfer" was intended to be
in lieu of a testamentary provision. The court
explained that "[i]f [the surviving spouse] was
merely given access to those funds to provide a
convenient method for managing the couple's
expenses, it was not a transfer to her." Taggart,
supra, 95 N.M. at 123-124, 619 P.2d at 568-569.
We do not believe that such a fine distinction
between a "transfer" and the intent that the
"transfer* be in lieu of a testamentary provision

mination. A litigant's contention, and a jury's
determination, that a spouse was given access to
joint tenancy funds in order to provide a convenient method for managing a couple's expenses
seems to us to be more appropriately dealt with
in regard to the intent that a "transfer" was in
lieu of a testamentary provision rather than in
regard to whether or not a "transfer" has in fact
occurred.
We conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury that the life insurance benefits
and joint tenancy properties were in fact "transfers" outside the will as a matter of law, while
leaving for the jury the ultimate determination
of whether or not it can be determined from the
amount alone that the transfers were intended
to be in lieu of a testamentary provision.

<»'J fnr-
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ing the issue of Jerry's intent for your
determination.
•
*
*
#
•
•

not intend these life insurance policies and
joint tenancy properties to be in lieu of a
testamentary provision.

"It is for the }\iry to determine whether
the amount of property transferred in
this case is sufficient to give rise to the
inference that Jerry intended one or
more of the transfers to be in lieu of
making any testamentary provision for
Susan."

1&-2W Ttiis court wffi not invade the
province of the jury to weigh evidence or to
determine the credibility of witnesses.
Powers v. Martinson, 313 N.W.2d 720, 728
(N.D.1981). In reviewing the evidence, we
view it in the light most favorable to the
verdict and if there is substantial evidence*
to support the verdict, we will not set it
aside. Powers, supra. We conclude that
there was substantial evidence to support
the jury's verdict

[7] In the previous appeal, this court
held that the district court erred in concluding on summary judgment that the intent
that a transfer to a spouse outside of the
will is in lieu of a testamentary provision
can be shown as a matter of law by an
amount which exceeds one-third of the augmented estate pursuant to § 30.1-05-01(2201), NDCC. Matter of Estate of Knudsen, supra. We did not hold that a trier of
fact cannot determine from the amount of
the transfers alone whether or not the decedent intended that the transfers be in
Yieu of a testamentary provision. Section
30.1-06-01(1)(2-301), NDCC, specifically
provides that this intent may be shown
"from the amount of the transfer or other
evidence." The trial court properly instructed the jury in this regard.
In a related contention, Susan argues
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict Jeffrey, Dann, and
Eric introduced evidence that Susan received, as the beneficiary of several life
insurance policies3 and as the survivor in
several joint tenancy properties, a total of
more than $437,000. The sons also estimated the total net worth of Jerry's estate
to be approximately $80,000, an amount
which Susan disputed. Susan also introduced testimony indicating that Jerry did
3. One of these life insurance policies was involved in the recent case of McCarney v. Knudsen, 342 N W.2d 380 (N.D.1983). In McCarney,
we held that the sons did not establish by clear
and convincing evidence an implied trust requiring Susan to use $130,000 in proceeds from
a life insurance policy to satisfy a debt of the
estate. The jury in the instant case was made
aware that the proceeds from this insurance
policy were the subject of litigation in another
action. The possible anomaly in trying these

Susan has also attacked several other
jury instructions and trial court rulings on
the admission and exclusion of evidence
during the trial. She cites no authority to
support her contentions and thus it is difficult to ascertain the bases for her arguments.
[11,12] In any event, a trial court need
not give instructions in the specific language requested by a litigant Instructions which fairly inform the jury of the
applicable law are all that is required.
State v. Dacktler, 318 N.W.2d 769, 774
(N.D.1982); South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819^ o2tHt&>
(N.D.1980). This court has also held that
no error in either the admission or exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in
any ruling or in anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties is
ground for setting aside a verdict "unless
refusal to take such action appears to the
court to be inconsistent with substantial
justice." Syllabus by the court in Intlehouse v. Rose, 153 N.W.2d 810, 812 (N.D.
1967). Counsel has pointed to nothing
actions separately was pointed out in McCarney,
supra, 342 N.W.2d at 381 n. 1.
We also note that this life insurance policy
was nominally taken out by Jerry's professional
corporation. Susan has not argued that because
the policy was taken out in the name of the
corporation, it did not constitute a transfer by
the testator, and we therefore do not decide the
issue today.
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which occurred during the trial that requires us to disturb the jury's verdict
The judgment is affirmed.
VANDE WALLE, Acting C J , GIERKE
and SAND, JJ., and ILVEDSON, Surrogate
Judge, concur.
ILVEDSON, Surrogate Judge, sitting in
place of ERICKSTAD, CJ., disqualified.

fEM>

In the Matter of the Petition of David
C. THOMPSON for Review of a Determination of the State Bar Board.
Civ. No. 10462.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Dec. 22, 1983.
Applicant for admission to the Bar petitioned to review a negative recommendation of the State Bar Board. The Supreme
Court held that the application would be
granted, notwithstanding the Board's negative recommendation based on applicant's
failure by three points to achieve minimum
scale score on multi-State Bar exammation
segment
Application granted.
Opinions of the Court to grant application were filed by Enckstad, CJ. f Pederson, VandeWalle and Gierke, JJ.
Sand, J., voted nay and filed opinion.
Attorney and Client ®=>1
Application for admission to Bar would
** approved notwithstanding State Bar
Board's negative recommendation based on
a
Pplicant's failure by three points to
*• The Admission to Practice Rules applicable to
this case are those m effect prior to the amend-

achieve minimum scale score on the multiState Bar examination segment, where applicant had above average scores on other
portions of examination, applicant made
showing that he was more severely affected by disturbing noises than other examinees and* Board's hearing officer indicated
that applicant was qualified. Admission to
Practice Rules 1, 3 (1982); NDCC 27-11-19;
Const. A r t 6, § 3.
Chapman & Chapman, Bismarck, for
Thompson; argued by Daniel J. Chapman,
Bismarck, and David C. Thompson, pro se.
Lundberg, Conmy, Nodland, Lucas &
Schulz, Bismarck, for State Bar Bd.; argued by Irvin B. Nodland, Bismarck.
ORDER
Opinions of the Court to grant Application for Admission to the Bar were filed on
December 22, 1983, by the Honorable
Ralph J. Erickstad, Chief Justice; the Honorable Vernon R. Pederson, the Honorable
Gerald W. VandeWalle, the Honorable H.F.
Gierke, III, Justices. An opinion to deny
the Application was filed by the Honorable
Paul M. Sand, Justice.
ORDERED, that a Certificate of Admission to the Bar be issued to David C.
Thompson in accordance with the opinions
filed and upon his taking the required Oath
and Pledge.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota convened at 11 a.m. this 22nd day of December, 1983, with the Honorable Ralph J.
Erickstad, Chief Justice; the Honorable
Paul M. Sand, the Honorable Vernon R.
Pederson, the Honorable Gerald W. VandeWalle, the Honorable H.F. Gierke, III, Justices; and Luella Dunn, Clerk, being
present, and directed the entry of the
above Order with Justice Sand voting nay.
SAND, Justice.
David C. Thompson has petitioned this
Court, pursuant to Rule 1(d)(3), of the Admission to Practice Rules 1 to review a negments of July 1, 1983.
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mation itself, but claims that the testimony
given at the preliminary hearing is insufficient to support a felony charge of escape.
The district court obviously dismissed the
charge because it concluded that O'Boyle's
conduct did not constitute a violation of the
Gass C felony portion of the statute
charged. The dismissal was in effect a
premature determination of the question of
guilt or innocence made before the submission of any evidence.
We conclude that the issue raised in
O'Boyle's motion to dismiss was not capable of determination without the trial of the
general issue, because it was the general
issue. The district court had no jurisdiction to decide O'Boyle's guilt or innocence
as a matter of law from evidence elicited at
the preliminary hearing. See United
States v. King, 581 F.2d 800 (10th Cir.
1978).
Even assuming that the evidence at trial
is the same as that shown in the preliminary
hearing transcript, the exact point at which
O'Boyle's conduct became an accomplished
"escape" cannot be determined as a matter
of law. It was error for the trial court to
conclude, without hearing any evidence,
that the escape was "completed" when
O'Boyle exited the vehicle and prior to the
time that a struggle occurred about two
hundred feet from the location of the vehicle. When the case is tried, issues relating
to lesser included offenses will likely arise.
For the reasons stated in this opinion,
O'Boyle's motion to dismiss the appeal is
denied, the order dismissing the information is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings.
ERICKSTAD, CJ.,
GIERKE, JJ., concur.

and SAND

and

VANDE WALLE, Justice, dissenting.
I do not agree that we can conclude the
Memorandum decision is intended to be a
™al order, thereby applying the statement
& State v. Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d 302, 304, n.
1
(N.D.1982), that "when the memorandum
Opinion contains an order which was intend^ to be a final order and the order is one
fr°*n which an appeal may be taken pursu-

ant to statute, we will treat the appeal as
an appeal from the order."
Here, the concluding paragraph of the
memorandum opinion from which the instant appeal is taken states, in part:
"Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ordered that the Information charging
the defendant with the Class C felony of
escape is hereby dismissed. Counsel for
the defendant may prepare the appropriate order of dismissal"
[Emphasis
supplied.]
Furthermore, as the majority opinion notes,
an order of dismissal, from which no appeal
was taken, was subsequently entered. The
facts of this case thus are more akin to
those in State v. Tinsley, 325 N.W.2d 177
(N.D.1982), in which a memorandum opinion containing the ruling of the trial court
was issued on February 10, 1982, followed
by an order dismissing Tinsley's application
for post-conviction relief on February 26,
1982. We held that under those circumstances the memorandum opinion did not
contain an appealable final order and we
dismissed the appeal.
Here, I can only conclude from the quoted wording of the memorandum opinion
that the memorandum opinion was not intended to be a final order and I would
dismiss the appeal because it is from a
memorandum opinion which is not appealable.
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Elsie
FRANDSON, Deceased.
Clarence SCHOTT, Petitioner
and Appellee,
v.
Louis FRANDSON, Respondent
and Appellant
Civ. No. 10628.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Oct 23, 1984.
Surviving spouse appealed from judgment entered bv the Cass County Court,
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East Centra] Judicial District, Donald J.
Cooke, J., which decreed that he was not an
omitted spouse under statute. The Supreme Court, Sand, J., held that trial
court's finding that deceased spouse provided for surviving spouse by transfers
outside will with intent that transfers be in
lieu of a testamentary provision was not
clearly erroneous, and thus surviving
spouse was not an omitted spouse under
statute.
Affirmed.

parties' stipulation which would have been
improper in a summary judgment proceeding. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).

Holand, Gray, Lochow & Sortland, Fargo, for petitioner and appellee; argued by
Donald C. Holand, Fargo.
Overboe & Cuffe, West Fargo, for respondent and appellant; argued by James
R. Britton, Fargo.
SAND, Justice.

1. Wills <s=*706, 782(11)
Trial court's finding that deceased
spouse provided for surviving spouse by
transfers outside will with intent that
transfers be in lieu of a testamentary provision was not clearly erroneous, and thus
surviving spouse was not an omitted
spouse. NDCC 30.1-06-01, subd. 1.
2. Joint Tenancy <s=>3
Wills <e=»782(ll)
Statute governing accounts and transfers nontestamentary simply provides that
the validity of a joint account with a right
of survivorship is not to be determined by
requirements for wills, and does not preclude consideration of joint bank account
and certificates of deposit as transfers for
purposes of omitted spouse statute.
NDCC 30.1-06-01, subd. 1, 30.1-31-06.
3. Judgment <3=>180, 183
Trial court in suit determining whether
surviving spouse was an omitted spouse
did not err in not granting surviving
spouse's motion for summary judgment
made during trial on ground that burden
was incorrectly placed upon him to show
that deceased spouse did not provide for
him by transfers outside will because estate submitted no evidence at hearing, but
limited itself to cross-examination of surviving spouse, in that surviving spouse did
not give notice of motion at least ten days
prior to time fixed for hearing and, regardless of who had burden of proof, trial court
would have been required to make a finding of fact regarding deceased spouses's
intent as a matter of law based solely on

Louis Frandson appealed from a county
court judgment which decreed that he is
not an omitted spouse under § 30.1-0601(2-301), N.D.C.C. We affirm.
Louis Frandson married Elsie Frandson
on 10 September 1978. Louis was 68 years
old and Elsie was 67 years old on the date
of the wedding, and both had been married
to other persons once before. Louis and
Elsie brought into the new marriage separate property.
According to Louis, during the first year
of their marriage Elsie suggested that they
have wills prepared. The couple went to
an attorney and Louis executed a will bequeathing all of his property to Elsie. Elsie, however, died on 19 June 1981 without
executing a new will. A will executed by
Elsie, on 3 June 1975 before her marriage
to Louis, was admitted to probate. The
will obviously did not contain a provision
for Louis nor was any reason given why
Louis should have been provided for in the
1975 wilL
Louis subsequently sought his intestate
share of Elsie's estate as an omitted
spouse. Counsel for the personal representative and counsel for Louis entered
into a stipulation listing the face values and
date of death values of property owned
solely by Elsie and property owned jointly
by Elsie and Louis. During the trial, additional items of Elsie's solely owned property were entered in evidence. Elsie's solely
owned property included farmland, a bank
account, and several certificates of deposit
The date of death value of Elsie's solely
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viving spouse in the form of life insurance
benefits and joint tenancy properties exceeded one-third of the augmented estate
did not warrant a conclusion, as a matter of
law, that the decedent intended those benefits to be in lieu of a testamentary provision for the surviving spouse. We reversed a summary judgment entered in favor of the personal representatives and remanded the case for trial. On remand, the
jury returned a verdict finding that the
transfers of property to the surviving
spouse outside the will were intended by
the
decedent to be in lieu of a testamentary
The county court determined that Elsie,
provision.
The surviving spouse appealed,
by her placement of property in joint tenancy, had provided for Louis by transfers asserting in part that the trial court erred
outside the will with the intent that the in instructing the jury that the amount of
transfers be in lieu of a testamentary pro- the transfers alone could be the basis for
vision pursuant to § 30.1-06-01 (2-301), determining if the decedent intended the
N.D.C.C. Judgment was entered decreeing transfers to be in lieu of a testamentary
that Louis was not an omitted spouse, and provision. We affirmed the judgment in
Matter of Estate of Knudsen, 342 N.W.2d
Louis has appealed.
387, 392 (N.D.1984) [Knudsen II\ stating:
Louis essentially contended on appeal:
"We did not hold [in Knudsen I] that a
(1) that the county court erred in determintrier of fact cannot determine from the
ing that he was not an omitted spouse; and
amount of the transfers alone whether or
(2) that the trial court erred in not granting
not the decedent intended that the transhis motion for summary judgment made
fers
be in lieu of a testamentary providuring the trial.
sion.
Section 30.1-06-01(1) (2-301),
Section 30.1-06-01(1) (2-301), N.D.C.C.,
NDCC, specifically provides that this inprovides:
tent may be shown 'from the amount of
"30.1-Ofc-Ol (2-301). Omitted spouse.
the transfer or other evidence.' The trial
—1. If a testator fails to provide by will
court properly instructed the jury in this
for his surviving spouse who married the
regard."
testator after the execution of the will,
In this case, Louis similarly asserts that
the omitted spouse shall receive the same
there
is "no evidence" in the record upon
share of the estate he would have rewhich
the county court could base its deterceived if the decedent left no will unless
it appears from the will that the omission mination that he does not qualify as an
was intentional or the testator provided omitted spouse. We disagree.
for the spouse by transfer outside the
[1] The evidence reveals that Elsie and
will and the intent that the transfer be in Louis were married for a relatively short
lieu of a testamentary provision is shown period of time. Although Louis had a will
by statements of the testator or from the prepared early in the marriage, Elsie never
amount of the transfer or other evi- did return to the attorney's office to exedence."
cute a new will. The evidence reflects that
This Court has construed the provisions Elsie, during the marriage, consciously reof the omitted spouse statute on two previ- tained certain assets in her own name.
ous occasions. In Matter of Estate of Louis received from Elsie a substantial porKnudsen, 322 N.W.2d 454 (N.D.1982) tion of her estate by her placement of
[Knudsen / ] , we held a mere showing that property into joint tenancy. Of the $136,the amount of benefits provided to a sur- 000 value of the property held in joint
owned property was more than $94,000.
The property owned jointly by Elsie and
Louis included their residence in West Fargo, an automobile, household appliances
and furnishings, and several bank accounts
and certificates of deposit The date of
death value of the property held in joint
tenancy by Elsie and Louis totaled more
than $136,000. The evidence established
that Elsie's contributions to the jointly
owned property were approximately $81,000 and that Louis' contributions were approximately $55,000.
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tenancy, Elsie contributed $81,000. Elsie's
contribution to the joint tenancy property
was almost as much as the amount she
retained for disposition by will. Having
carefully reviewed the record, we cannot
say the trial court's finding that Elsie provided for Louis by transfers outside the
will with the intent that the transfers be in
lieu of a testamentary provision is clearly
erroneous. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.
We note that a substantial amount of the
joint tenancy properties in this case consisted of joint bank accounts and certificates
of deposit Although neither party has
raised as an issue the possible application
of § 30.1-31-06 (6-106), N.D.C.C, to this
case, we deem it appropriate to point out
that this statute does not dictate a different result
Section 30.1-31-06 (6-106), N.D.C.C, provides:
"20.1-31-Q6. (6-106) Accounts and
transfers nontestamentary.
Any transfers resulting from the application of section 30.1-31-04 are effective by reason of
the account contracts involved and this
statute and are not to be considered as
testamentary or subject to chapters 30.101 through 30.1-25, except as provided in
sections 30.1-05-01 through 30.1-05-07,
and except as a consequence of, and to
the extent directed by, section 30.1-3107."

wills. The section is consistent with section 30.1-31-14."
The Editorial Board Comment to-§ 30.131-14 (6-201), N.D.C.C, which is entitled
''Provisions for payment or transfer at
death," states in part:
"Because the types of provisions described in the statute are characterized
as nontestamentary, the instrument does
not have to be executed in compliance
with section 30.1-08-02; nor does it have
to be probated; nor does the personal
representative have any power or duty
with respect to the assets involved."
We also note that the Editorial Board Comment to the pretermitted children statute,
§ 30.1-06-02 (2-302), N.D.C.C, states that
oral evidence is allowed "to establish a
testator's intent that . . . nonprobate transfers such as life insurance or joint accounts are in lieu of a testamentary provision
" [Emphasis added.]
[2] Construing § 30.1-31-06 (6-106),
JV.D.C.C, "with a view to effecting its obj^cts and to promoting justice" [§ 1-02-01,
N.D.C.C], we conclude that the statute
simply provides that the validity of a joint
account with a right of survivorship is not
to be determined by the requirements for
wills, and does not preclude consideration
of joint bank accounts and certificates of
deposit as transfers for purposes of the
omitted spouse statute.1

Although this statute is far from a model
of clarity, its purpose and intent are succinctly stated in the Editorial Board Comment to the section:
"The purpose of classifying the transactions contemplated by chapter 30.1-31
as nontestamentary is to bolster the explicit statement that their validity as effective modes of transfers at death is not
to be determined by the requirements for

[3] Louis asserts that the trial court
e*red in not granting his motion for summary judgment made during trial because
"[t]he estate submitted no evidence at the
hearing . . . but limited itself to cross examination of Louis
" According to
Louis, this incorrectly placed the burden
upon him to show that Elsie did not provide
for him by transfers outside the will.
There are several problems with this argunienL

1. We have discovered no case law from other
Uniform Probate Code jurisdictions interpreting
U.P.C. § 6-106 in conjunction with the omitted
spouse statute. However, courts in Arizona and
New Mexico appear to have recognized that
joint bank accounts can be considered as transfers for purposes of the omitted spouse statute,
but have made no mention of U.P.C. § 6-106.

See Matter of Estate of Beaman, 119 Ariz. 614,
617-618, 583 P.2d 270, 273-274 (ArizXtApp.
1978); Ariz.Rev.StaLAnn. §§ 14-2301 and 146106 (1975); Matter of Estate of Taggart, 95
N.M. 117, 123-124, 619 P.2d 562, 568-569 (N.M.
CLApp.1980); N.M.StaLAnn. §§ 45-2-301 and
45-6-106 (1978); AnnoL, 11 A.L.R. 4th 1213
(1982).
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First, a motion for summary judgment
must be served on the opposing party at
least ten days prior to the time fixed for
the hearing. Rule 56(c), N.D.R.Civ.P. An
examination of the record reveals that no
notice was given in this case. Cf. Temme
v. Travel, 102 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1960).
Second, the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Roll v.
Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648 (N.D.1983). In this
case, the parties had stipulated to the value
of the property held in joint tenancy by
Louis and Elsie, and this Court has held
that the amount of the transfers alone may
in some circumstances be sufficient for a
trier of fact to find the intent that the
transfers be in lieu of a testamentary provision. See Knudsen II, supra. Thus, regardless of who had the burden of proof,
the trial court would have been required to
make a finding of fact regarding Elsie's
intent as a matter of law based solely on
the parties' stipulation which would have
been improper in a summary judgment proceeding. See Knudsen If supra. The trial
court did not err in refusing to grant Louis'
motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE, PEDERSON and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur.
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STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Bob MATHISEN, a.k.a. Robert Mathisen,
Defendant and Appellant
Cr. Nos. 987 and 995 to 1001.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Oct 23, 1984.
Defendant was convicted in the County
Court, Stark County, Donald L. Jorgensen,

J., of issuing checks without sufficient
funds and was held in contempt for failing
to comply with conditions of prior judgment The Supreme Court, Sand, J., held
that: (1) statute under which defendant
was convicted does not deny equal protection on the basis of wealth; (2) it was
immaterial whether defendant had an erroneous innocent impression that there were
sufficient funds on deposit; and (3) defendant had made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial.
Affirmed.
Pederson, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result.

1. Constitutional Law <3>213.1(1)
False Pretenses <3>2, 22
Statute prohibiting the issuing of a
check without sufficient funds does not
make an unconstitutional classification on
the basis of wealth; statute merely permits, but does not require, a notice of dishonor to be sent and does not make subsequent payment an affirmative defense.
NDCC 6-08-16.
2. Constitutional Law <s»211(3)
Facially neutral statute may violate
equal protection in its application or effect.
3. Constitutional Law <s=250.1(3)
Selective prosecution, if based upon improper motives, can violate constitutional
guarantees of equal protection but selective enforcement in and of itself is not a
constitutional violation.
4. Criminal Law ®=>37.10(1)
To support a defense of selective prosecution, defendant must establish that other individuals similarly situated have not
generally been prosecuted and that the
state's selection of him for prosecution is
invidious or in bad faith.
5. False Pretenses @=>6
Defendant who had knowledge that
payment on cashier's check which he had

